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Abstract
We develop identification and estimation methods for treatment effect models with strategic interaction in
the treatment decisions. We consider models where one’s treatment choice and outcome can be endogenously
affected by others’ treatment choices. We formulate the interaction of the treatment decisions as a two-player
complete information gamewith potential multiple equilibria. For this model, using a latent index framework
and the assumption of a stochastic equilibrium selection rule, we prove that the marginal treatment effect
from one’s own treatment and that from his/her partner’s can be separately point-identified with potential
over-identifiability. Based on our constructive identification results, we propose a two-step semiparametric
procedure for estimating the marginal treatment effects using series approximation. The proposed estimator
is shown to be uniformly consistent and asymptotically normal. As an empirical illustration, we investigate
the impacts of risky behaviors on adolescents’ academic performance.
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1 Introduction
Studies of treatment evaluation commonly rely on the assumption that one’s outcome is not affected by others’
treatment status, which is the so-called stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). However, SUTVA is
often criticized as empirically implausible. For example, in the evaluation of the effect of smoking behavior
on health outcomes for couples, SUTVA imposes that one’s health outcome is not affected by his/her partner’s
smoking behavior. Other examples include empirical studies of social interactions in education. It is commonly
observed that peer behavior such as delinquent activities among close friends has a significant impact on
students’ academic performance (i.e., a contextual effect; Manski, 1993). For another example, consider the
competition between large retail chains. In each major city or region, they decide whether to establish a local
branch office. Here, we would be interested in measuring the effects of the presence of branch offices on the
outcomes, such as revenue, market share, and the number of stores opened in each local market. Clearly, SUTVA
is violated in this case as well. Given these arguments, certain studies have attempted to relax SUTVA (e.g.,
Hong and Raudenbush, 2006; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008; Ferracci et al., 2014; Aronow and Samii, 2017).
However, they typically assume (conditional) independence among the individual treatment variables and such
an assumption is unsuitable for the above-mentioned examples.
The objective of this study is to develop identification and estimation methods for treatment effect models
that allow the violation of SUTVA (i.e., treatment spillover) and the endogenous interaction of the treatment
decisions among agents. In particular, we focus on the setup in which an interaction occurs between each pair
of agents (e.g., couples, best friends, twins, or duopoly firms) and postulate that they make decisions on their
treatment status simultaneously in a binary game of complete information. Within this framework, we aim to
formulate a set of reasonable sufficient conditions under which the treatment effect parameters such as marginal
treatment effects (MTE), local average treatment effects (LATE), and policy-relevant treatment effects (PRTE)
can be point-identified.1
To this end, we have to address two non-trivial issues. The first issue is the non-applicability of standard
ordered monotonicity and unordered monotonicity (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999,
2005; Heckman and Pinto, 2018).2 The monotonicity conditions require that shifts in instruments determine
the direction of changes in treatment choices uniformly in all agents. As shown in Vytlacil (2002) and Heckman
and Pinto (2018), these monotonicity conditions are equivalent to assuming an additive separable model in
which the effects of the instruments on the treatment decisions are additively separable from unobservable
error terms. However, in our situation, one’s treatment choice strategically (nonlinearly) depends on another’s
treatment choice. Consequently, a shift in one’s instrument can interact with both his/her and his/her partner’s
unobservables in a non-additive way, implying the failure of the monotonicity conditions. As a result, the
conventional treatment evaluation methods that rely on the monotonicity conditions are not suitable for our
framework.
1 To the best of our knowledge, few studies address treatment evaluation in the presence of strategic interaction, where the treatment
decisions are explicitly modeled as games. One important exception is Balat and Han (2018), who mainly investigate the partial
identification of average treatment effects (ATE). Thus, our main parameters of interest (MTE) are different from theirs (ATE). In
addition, the key identification assumptions in Balat and Han (2018) are shape restrictions on the conditional mean outcome functions,
while we mainly rely on a stochastic equilibrium selection rule, as stated below.
2 As another related work, Mogstad et al. (2019) introduce partial monotonicity to deal with issues due to multiple instruments.
However, partial monotonicity is not designed for settings with multivalued or multidimensional treatments such as our situation.
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The second issue is the possibility of multiple equilibria in the treatment decisions. The presence of multiple
equilibria leads to an incomplete econometric model (see Tamer, 2003; Lewbel, 2007; Ciliberto and Tamer,
2009; Chesher and Rosen, 2012, among others) in the sense that model-consistent treatment assignment is not
unique. The issue of incompleteness has been a common problem in the literature on game model estimation;
however, it is not yet well understood in the context of treatment evaluation.
Our identification strategy, which solves these two issues simultaneously, is the combination of extending
the local instrumental variable (LIV) method developed in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) and imposing a
stochastic equilibrium selection rule in the treatment decision game. The key idea behind our approach is to use
local variations of the pair of instrumental variables that alter players’ treatment status but do not directly affect
their outcomes. Although this is a natural extension of the LIV method to a multidimensional space, it is still
insufficient for the point-identification of the treatment effect parameters of interest owing to the presence of
multiple equilibria. We overcome this by explicitly introducing an empirically reasonable equilibrium selection
rule; that is, we assume that the treatment decision under multiple equilibria follows a simple probabilistic
threshold model.3 We later clarify that our approach builds on the recent study by Lee and Salanié (2018), who
consider identification of multivalued treatment models based on a set of threshold crossing rules.
This study presents the following novel identification results. Firstly, we point-identify the following MTEs
that are not identifiable in the conventional framework: direct MTE, in which only one’s own treatment status
switches from untreated to treated, whereas his/her partner’s is left unchanged; indirectMTE, in which only one’s
partner’s treatment status switches from untreated to treated, whereas one’s own status is left unchanged; and
total MTE, in which the treatment status of both players switches from untreated to treated. The identification of
these parameters helps us understand the sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the treatment effects in more
detail than under the conventional framework. The conventional MTE reveals heterogeneity in the treatment
effect only with respect to individuals’ own unobservable characteristics. By contrast, our framework allows
us to also examine how one’s treatment effect is related to the other’s unobservables. Secondly, we show that
the presence of multiple equilibria results in the over-identification of the MTE parameters. Importantly, we
demonstrate that this over-identifiability gives us an opportunity to improve the efficiency of theMTE estimation.
Thirdly, although the treatment evaluation is our main concern, we also provide new results for the identification
of binary game models of complete information.
Our identification of the MTEs is constructive in that we can estimate them directly following the identifica-
tion strategy. We propose a two-step semiparametric procedure for the estimation of the MTEs. In the first step,
we estimate the parameters in the treatment decision game using a maximum likelihood (ML) approach. Using
the estimates from the first step, in the second step, we estimate the MTEs by formulating the outcome equation
as a partially linear model in which we employ semiparametric series (sieve) estimation techniques to estimate
the outcome equation. The proposed estimator is uniformly consistent with the optimal convergence rate and
asymptotically normally distributed. In addition, the estimator possesses an oracle property in the sense that
its limiting distribution is the same as that of the infeasible estimator, where the parameters in the treatment
decision game are assumed to be known. The asymptotic results for our two-step semiparametric estimation
are interesting in their own right and novel in the series estimation literature.
3 This assumption does not imply that the players take mixed strategies; rather, it assumes that although the players are deterministic,
there are some unobserved (by econometricians) random variables that determine their decisions on the equilibrium choices. For more
details, see Assumption 3.2.
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To empirically illustrate ourmethods, we investigate the impacts of a best friend’s delinquency (e.g., smoking
and drinking alcohol) on adolescents’ academic outcomes. Following the literature (e.g., Card and Giuliano,
2013), we consider the decision to participate in such risky activities as a complete information game among
best friends of opposite genders. Our methods reveal new statistical evidence that both the direct and the total
treatment effects of risky behaviors on academic performance are significantly negative for both genders. In
particular, we find that male students are more easily influenced by their friends’ delinquency than female
students.
Organization of the paper. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our
model and briefly review the incompleteness problem for discrete game models. In Section 3, the identification
of the MTE parameters is established. In Section 4, we propose two-step semiparametric estimators for the
MTEs using series approximation and show their asymptotic properties. Section 5 presents the empirical
application. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. The proofs of all the theorems and technical lemmas are
given in Appendices A and B. Other supplementary technical results are provided in Appendices C and D.
In Appendix E, the identification of several treatment parameters other than the MTE, such as the individual-
specific treatment effects, LATE, and PRTE, is investigated. Appendix F presents Monte Carlo experiments to
examine the finite sample performance of our estimator. Supplementary tables for the empirical analysis are
provided in Appendix G.
Notation. For a natural number n, In denotes the n × n identity matrix. For positive integers a1 and a2,
0a1×a2 denotes the a1 × a2 zero matrix. We denote the indicator function as 1(·). For a random variable X ,
supp[X] denotes the support of X . For a matrix A, ‖A‖ denotes its Frobenius norm, i.e., ‖A‖ =
√
tr{A>A},
where tr{·} is the trace. When A is a square matrix, we use χmax(A) and χmin(A) to denote its largest and
smallest eigenvalues, respectively. We denote any symmetric generalized inverse of a matrix A by A−.
2 Model
In this section, we present our treatment effect model with strategic interaction. We denote a player by j and
his/her partner (or opponent) by −j throughout the paper, where j ∈ {1, 2}. We aim to evaluate the effects of
player j’s treatmentDj ∈ {0, 1} and/or his/her partner’s treatmentD−j ∈ {0, 1} on his/her outcome Yj and/or
his/her partner’s outcome Y−j . The outcomes may or may not be common to both players; that is, we allow
both Yj = Y−j and Yj 6= Y−j . The treatment Dj may be endogenous in the sense that Dj may be correlated
with the unobservable determinants of Yj and Y−j .
Let Y (dj ,d−j)j be the potential outcome for player j when his/her own treatment status is Dj = dj and
his/her partner’s is D−j = d−j for (dj , d−j) ∈ {0, 1}2. This potential outcome notation explicitly allows
player j’s outcome to depend on his/her partner’s treatment D−j . The observed outcome can be written as
Yj =
∑1
dj=0
∑1
d−j=0 I
(dj ,d−j)Y
(dj ,d−j)
j , where I(dj ,d−j) := 1(Dj = dj , D−j = d−j). Suppose that player j’s
potential outcome can be written as
Y
(dj ,d−j)
j = µ
(dj ,d−j)
j
(
Xj , U
(dj ,d−j)
j
)
, (2.1)
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whereXj ∈ Rdim(X) is a vector of the observable covariates,U (dj ,d−j)j ∈ R is an unobservable random variable,
and µ(dj ,d−j)j is an unknown structural function. The covariates X1 and X2 may contain common elements as
well as some player-specific elements. For simplicity, we assume that the dimensions of X1 and X2 are both
equal to dim(X), and the same assumption will be made for the other variables. The model specification (2.1)
is fairly general in that U (dj ,d−j)j and µ
(dj ,d−j)
j can depend on the player type j and treatment status (dj , d−j).
2.1 Strategic interaction in the treatment decisions
To account for the strategic interaction between players, we presume a natural extension of the latent index
model in Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005). Suppose that player j’s treatment is determined by
Dj = 1 (pij(D−j ,Wj) ≥ εj) , (2.2)
whereWj := (X>j , Z>j )> is a vector including Xj and the instrument Zj ∈ Rdim(Z), εj ∈ R is a continuously
distributed unobservable random variable, and pij is an unknown function. We do not restrict the dependence
structure between εj and U
(dj ,d−j)
j , which is the source of the endogeneity. We assume that the instruments
include at least one player-specific variable. The instruments are required to satisfy an exclusion restriction and
a relevance condition as in the standard instrumental variable framework. Specifically, we assume that Zj is
independent of the unobservables εj andU
(dj ,d−j)
j and thatZj can cause variations in the value of pij(D−j ,Wj).
In addition, when using an LIV method to identify the treatment effects, we require that not all the elements of
Zj are discrete.4 More formal conditions on the instruments are discussed below.
For the subsequent analysis, it is convenient to transform model (2.2) as follows. Firstly, asD−j is a binary
variable, without loss of generality, we can write
pij(D−j ,Wj) = pi0j (Wj) +D−j ·
(
pi1j (Wj)− pi0j (Wj)
)
, (2.3)
for the functions pi0j (·) := pij(0, ·) and pi1j (·) := pij(1, ·). Let X := (X1, X2), and
Vj := Fεj (εj |X), P 0j := Fεj
(
pi0j (Wj)
∣∣∣X) , P 1j := Fεj (pi1j (Wj)∣∣∣X) , (2.4)
where Fεj (·|X) is the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) of εj given X . By construction, Vj
is distributed as Uniform[0, 1] conditional onX . Combining these definitions and (2.3), we can rewrite (2.2) as
Dj = 1
(
P 0j +D−j · (P 1j − P 0j ) ≥ Vj
)
. (2.5)
The treatment decision rule (2.5) is almost surely (a.s.) equivalent to
Dj = argmax
d∈{0,1}
d · {P 0j +D−j · (P 1j − P 0j )− Vj}.
4 Even when only discrete instrumental variables are available, if one makes a parametric functional form assumption on the
conditional expectation of U (dj ,d−j)j given (V1, V2), where (V1, V2) are defined in (2.4), there is a chance of identifying the MTE as in
Brinch et al. (2017).
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That is, we can view Dj as the maximizer of the “payoff function” d · {P 0j + D−j · (P 1j − P 0j ) − Vj}. Player
j takes the treatment if and only if his/her payoff gain P 0j + D−j · (P 1j − P 0j ) − Vj is positive. Otherwise,
j does not take the treatment and his/her payoff is zero (for normalization). Here, we assume that (Wj , εj)
and (W−j , ε−j) are common knowledge to both players, which motivates us to interpret the set of treatments
(Dj , D−j) as the result from a simultaneous treatment decision game with complete information.
To proceed with our analysis, we assume that whether the treatment decisions of players j and −j are
strategic complements or strategic substitutes is known to us a priori. The treatment decisions are complements
(resp. substitutes) if and only if the strategic interaction effect P 1j −P 0j is positive (resp. negative). Thus, in line
with our empirical application, we hereafter restrict our main focus to the case of complementarity; however, it
is not difficult to modify our approach for the case of strategic substitutes.
Assumption 2.1. Strategic complementarity: P 1j − P 0j > 0 (a.s.) for both j = 1 and 2.
Remark 2.1 (Players’ roles). The roles (types) of the players in a pair are allowed to be either asymmetric or
symmetric. If the players’ roles are asymmetric, the subscripts j and−j have a specific meaning. For example,
when the pair indicates a married couple, players 1 and 2 correspond to wife and husband, respectively. For
another example, when the pair is composed of best friends, the player indices 1 and 2 might represent their
genders or relative ages. By contrast, if the roles are symmetric, the subscripts j and −j have no implication.
That is, the players do not have distinguished roles in this case. Our methods are applicable to both cases.
2.2 Incompleteness
A major difficulty in our model is the incompleteness of the treatment decision model owing to the presence
of multiple equilibria. The realized treatment status based on (2.5) can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium in the
complete information game with the payoff matrix given in Table 1.
Table 1: Payoff matrix
D2 = 0 D2 = 1
D1 = 0 (0, 0) (0, P
0
2 − V2)
D1 = 1 (P
0
1 − V1, 0) (P 11 − V1, P 12 − V2)
There are potentially multiple equilibria in this game. Under strategic complementarity, it is easy to see that
we have the following relationship between the realized treatment (D1, D2) and unobservables (V1, V2):
(D1, D2) = (1, 1) =⇒ V1 ≤ P 11 , V2 ≤ P 12 ,
(D1, D2) = (1, 0) ⇐⇒ V1 ≤ P 01 , V2 > P 12 ,
(D1, D2) = (0, 1) ⇐⇒ V1 > P 11 , V2 ≤ P 02 ,
(D1, D2) = (0, 0) =⇒ V1 > P 01 , V2 > P 02 .
(2.6)
Figure 1 visually summarizes the relationships shown in (2.6).
As shown in the figure, the space of V := (V1, V2) cannot be partitioned into non-overlapping regions
associated with the four alternative realizations of D := (D1, D2). Both D = (1, 1) and D = (0, 0) can occur
when P 01 < V1 ≤ P 11 and P 02 < V2 ≤ P 12 , and in this case, the value of D is not uniquely determined. This
6
Figure 1: Nash equilibrium under strategic complementarity.
non-uniqueness of model-consistent decisions is called incompleteness and has been extensively studied in the
literature on simultaneous equation models for discrete outcomes.
To handle the incompleteness problem, there are essentially three approaches in the game econometrics
literature (see de Paula (2013) for an excellent survey on this topic). The first approach is to focus only on
the outcomes that can occur as unique equilibria (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990; Berry, 1992). In our case,
this happens for D = (1, 0) and D = (0, 1). Then, based on the probability of D = (1, 0), D = (0, 1), and
D ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 1)}, one can form the likelihood function to estimate the parameters. The second approach is
to use a partial identification strategy (e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009; Chesher and Rosen, 2012). Clearly, the
upper (resp. lower) bound of the probability ofD = (1, 1) can be attained ifD = (1, 1) is always (resp. never)
selected when V falls in the multiple equilibria region. A similar argument applies to the case of D = (0, 0).
Using these inequalities, we can obtain the bounds of the parameters. The third approach is to explicitly
introduce a probabilistic (or possibly deterministic) equilibrium selection mechanism (e.g., Bjorn and Vuong,
1984; Kooreman, 1994; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007; Bajari et al., 2010; Card and Giuliano, 2013; Khan and
Nekipelov, 2018). Although the first and second approaches are theoretically less restrictive than the third, they
do not provide any information about the choice betweenD = (0, 0) and (1, 1) on the region of multiplicity. As
discussed later, without additional information on the equilibrium selection, it is challenging to point-identify
the treatment parameters for the cases ofD = (0, 0) and (1, 1). Thus, this necessitates the adoption of the third
approach.
Remark 2.2 (Identification-at-infinity). For the identification of discrete games, some studies suggest using an
identification-at-infinity strategy, which requires the presence of “large support” regressors (e.g., Tamer, 2003;
Bajari et al., 2010). The identification-at-infinity approach has advantages in that the parameters can be point-
identified without explicitly introducing equilibrium selection rules under weaker equilibrium concepts than the
Nash equilibrium (see Kline, 2015). However, it is well known that estimators based on the identification-at-
infinity have a slower convergence rate and do not perform well in finite samples (cf. Khan and Tamer, 2010).
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In addition, regardless of whether we use the identification-at-infinity approach, we should introduce certain
assumptions on the equilibrium selection to “fully” identify the structure of the treatment decision game.
Remark 2.3 (Monotonicity). From Figure 1 and (2.6), we find that the standard monotonicity and unordered
monotonicity conditions are not applicable to our situation. For example, consider the pairs of agents in the
region of multiple equilibria and those in the region of D = (1, 0) for a given Z = z with Z := (Z1, Z2).
Further, suppose that a shift of Z from z to z′ induces the former set of pairs toD = (0, 1) and the latter to the
multiple equilibria. In this case, some of the former pairs would switch their treatment statuses fromD = (0, 0)
to D = (0, 1), while some of the latter pairs would switch from D = (1, 0) to D = (0, 0). Thus, the change in
the values of the instruments results in both inflows intoD = (0, 0) and outflows from it, implying the violation
of the monotonicity conditions. Note that these monotonicity conditions do not hold in general, even when
multiple equilibria do not exist.
3 Identification
In this section, the identification of the treatment effect parameters is discussed. We here refer to the treatment
decision game (2.5) as the “first stage” and the realization of the outcome (2.1) as the “second stage”. In this
section, for expositional simplicity, we treat the parameters in the first stage as known to us and focus solely
on the identification of the parameters of interest for the second stage. More specifically, we implicitly assume
sufficient conditions under which the conditional CDF and density of V given X = x, which we denote by
H(v1, v2|x) and h(v1, v2|x), respectively, and the variables P 01 , P 11 , P 02 , and P 12 defined in (2.4) are identified.
The identification and consistent estimation of these parameters is discussed in detail in Appendix D and Section
4, respectively.
To state the following assumptions, we introduce additional notations as follows: Y := (Y1, Y2), W :=
(W1,W2), ε := (ε1, ε2), and U (d1,d2) := (U
(d1,d2)
1 , U
(d2,d1)
2 ) for (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2. Here, we formally
introduce the exclusion restriction and relevance condition for the instruments Z.
Assumption 3.1.
(i) For all (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2, the instruments Z are excluded from the structural functions in (2.1) and are
independent of the unobservables ε and U (d1,d2) conditional on X .
(ii) For both j = 1 and 2, the instrument Zj contains continuous variables such that pi0j (Wj) and pi1j (Wj) are
non-degenerate and continuously distributed conditional on X .
These are standard requirements for the LIV method. Assumption 3.1(i) requires that the instruments Z do
not directly affect the outcomes Y and are conditionally independent of the error terms. By construction, the
transformed error V is also conditionally independent of Z given X . Thus, the conditional distributions of V
and U (d1,d2) givenW are identical to those given X . Assumption 3.1(ii) requires that the instrument Zj must
contain a continuous non-trivial determinant of Dj .
We provide below a series of identification results only for player 1 (the results for player 2 are symmetric
and thus omitted). We first discuss the identification of the conditional means of the potential outcomes:
m
(d1,d2)
1 (x, p1, p2) := E[Y
(d1,d2)
1 |X = x, V1 = p1, V2 = p2] for (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2. (3.1)
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We call these functions the marginal treatment response (MTR) functions, as in Mogstad et al. (2018).
Once the MTR functions are identified, we can identify the MTE parameters straightforwardly. Since the
number of treatment patterns is four (i.e.,D ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)}), there are six combinations of pairs
(i.e., six distinct MTE parameters for each player). From the point of view of player 1, the parameters of interest
would be the direct MTE, indirect MTE, and total MTE, which are defined as
τ
(d2)
direct(x, p1, p2) := m
(1,d2)
1 (x, p1, p2)−m(0,d2)1 (x, p1, p2) for d2 ∈ {0, 1},
τ
(d1)
indirect(x, p1, p2) := m
(d1,1)
1 (x, p1, p2)−m(d1,0)1 (x, p1, p2) for d1 ∈ {0, 1},
τtotal(x, p1, p2) := m
(1,1)
1 (x, p1, p2)−m(0,0)1 (x, p1, p2),
respectively. In the conventional framework, we can identify the source of unobserved heterogeneity in the
treatment effects only up to the player’s own unobservable factor V1. By contrast, our MTE parameters are also
informative about the variation of the treatment effects with his/her partner’s unobservable V2.
3.1 Identification of the MTR functions
We first consider the case where D is equal to either (1, 0) or (0, 1). In this case, V resides in the regions with
a unique equilibrium. We next show that the following quantities can be identified:
m
(1,0)
1 (x, p
0
1, p
1
2) for (p01, p12) ∈ supp[P 01 , P 12 |X = x,D = (1, 0)],
m
(0,1)
1 (x, p
1
1, p
0
2) for (p11, p02) ∈ supp[P 11 , P 02 |X = x,D = (0, 1)].
The former is the MTR function for player 1 when D = (1, 0) is realized and V is located at point A in
Figure 2. At this point, players 1 and 2 are indifferent between the actions D = (1, 0), (1, 1), and (0, 0) given
that (P 01 , P 12 ) = (p01, p12) holds. Thus, only a small deviation from (p01, p12) may result in different treatment
decisions from D = (1, 0). Similarly, the latter is the case when D = (0, 1) and V is at point D in the figure,
where the players are indifferent between D = (0, 1), (1, 1), and (0, 0).
We define the following function:
ψ
(d1,d2)
1 (x, p
d2
1 , p
d1
2 ) := E[I
(d1,d2)Y1|X = x, P d21 = pd21 , P d12 = pd12 ] for (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2,
which can be directly identified from the data for (pd21 , p
d1
2 ) ∈ supp[P d21 , P d12 |X = x,D = (d1, d2)]. Hereafter,
when there is no confusion, we suppress the subscript 1 from m(d1,d2)1 and ψ
(d1,d2)
1 for notational simplicity.
The next theorem formally states thatm(1,0)(x, p01, p12) andm(0,1)(x, p11, p02) can be identified.
Theorem3.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1 and 3.1 hold for the outcome equation (2.1) and treatment decisions
from (2.6). Then, ifm(1,0)(x, v1, v2),m(0,1)(x, v1, v2), and h(v1, v2|x) are continuous in (v1, v2), we have
m(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) = −
1
h(p01, p
1
2|x)
∂2ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
,
m(0,1)(x, p11, p
0
2) = −
1
h(p11, p
0
2|x)
∂2ψ(0,1)(x, p11, p
0
2)
∂p11∂p
0
2
.
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Figure 2: Points at which the MTR functions are identified.
This states that as the quantities on the right-hand sides are identified from the data, the parameters on
the left-hand sides can be identified.5 Note that the above theorem holds without assuming any equilibrium
selection rule. Our identification result has unique features compared with the results of previous studies (e.g.,
Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005; Carneiro and Lee, 2009) in some respects. Firstly, the presence of the joint density
h(v1, v2|x) in the denominator reflects the possible correlation between the unobservables V1 and V2. Secondly,
the identification is achieved through the cross-partial derivatives with respect to p1 and p2 as a consequence of
the treatment spillover.
A sketch of the proof form(1,0)(x, p01, p12) would be helpful to illustrate the identification strategy used here.
It can be shown that
ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) = E[Y
(1,0)
1 |X = x, V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12] · Pr[V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12|X = x]
=
∫ 1
p12
∫ p01
0
m(1,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2.
Partially differentiating both sides with respect to p01 and p12 yields the desired result. In this derivation, we
require strategic complementarity in Assumption 2.1 so that the treatment status D = (1, 0) may be uniquely
linked with the region of V (i.e., the upper left region in Figures 1 and 2). Assumption 3.1(i) is required so that
the first equality may be derived, and the conditions by P 01 and P 12 be ignored. Assumption 3.1(ii) ensures that
the partial differentiation with respect to p01 and p12 is well defined.
5 Similarly, replacing Y1 in ψ(1,0)1 (x, p
0
1, p
1
2) with 1 leads to
h(p01, p
1
2|x) = − ∂
2
∂p01∂p
1
2
Pr[D = (1, 0)|X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12].
Similar results hold for the other realizations of D; as such, they would provide some testable implications for the specification of the
distribution of V .
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We move on to the identification of the MTR functions for D = (0, 0) and D = (1, 1). Since these
treatment values are not uniquely selected when V is in the multiple equilibria region (i.e., the central shaded
area in Figures 1 and 2), we introduce an additional assumption on the equilibrium selection that leads to the
point-identification of the parameters of interest. We write the region of V where multiple equilibria occur as
Vmul(P) :=
{
(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2 : P 01 < v1 ≤ P 11 , P 02 < v2 ≤ P 12
}
,
where P = (P 01 , P 11 , P 02 , P 12 ). Further, we denote the region of V where D = (0, 0) is uniquely selected by
V(0,0)uni (P) :=
{
(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2 : P 01 < v1, P 02 < v2
} \Vmul(P).
For notational convenience, we often write Vmul = Vmul(p) and V(0,0)uni = V(0,0)uni (p) by suppressing their
dependence on P = p, where p = (p01, p11, p02, p12) are fixed values.
We introduce the following assumption on the selection of treatment status.
Assumption 3.2. There exist an unknown constant λ ∈ [0, 1] and an unobservable random variable  distributed
as Uniform[0, 1] independent of (W, ε, U (d1,d2)) such that when V ∈ Vmul(P),D = (0, 0) occurs if and only if
 ≤ λ, that is,
D = (0, 0)⇐⇒ V ∈ V(0,0)uni (P) ∨ (V ∈ Vmul(P) ∧  ≤ λ),
where ∧ and ∨ denote the operations of logical conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
This states that the players select action D = (0, 0) with probability λ ∈ [0, 1] in the multiple equilibria
situation. Similarly to the conditional CDF and density of V and the variables P, we treat λ as an identified
parameter here, and indeed we show its identifiability in Appendix D. Although we introduce Assumption 3.2
for tractability, we can instead consider imposing a more general structure on the equilibrium selection (cf. Jun
and Pinkse, 2017). For example, we can relax the assumption by allowing λ to depend on X .
To state the next theorem, define the following function:
ψ(d1,d2)(x,p) := E[I(d1,d2)Y1|X = x,P = p],
which can be identified from the data for p ∈ supp[P|X = x,D = (d1, d2)].
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 3.1, and 3.2 hold for the outcome equation (2.1) and treatment
decisions from (2.6). Then, if m(0,0)(x, v1, v2), m(1,1)(x, v1, v2), and h(v1, v2|x) are continuous in (v1, v2),
we have
m(0,0)(x, p01, p
0
2) =
1
λh(p01, p
0
2|x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x,p)
∂p01∂p
0
2
for λ > 0,
m(0,0)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) =
1
(1− λ)h(pd11 , pd22 |x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x,p)
∂pd11 ∂p
d2
2
for λ < 1 and d1 6= d2,
m(0,0)(x, p11, p
1
2) = −
1
(1− λ)h(p11, p12|x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x,p)
∂p11∂p
1
2
for λ < 1,
11
and
m(1,1)(x, p01, p
0
2) = −
1
λh(p01, p
0
2|x)
∂2ψ(1,1)(x,p)
∂p01∂p
0
2
for λ > 0,
m(1,1)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) =
1
λh(pd11 , p
d2
2 |x)
∂2ψ(1,1)(x,p)
∂pd11 ∂p
d2
2
for λ > 0 and d1 6= d2,
m(1,1)(x, p11, p
1
2) =
1
(1− λ)h(p11, p12|x)
∂2ψ(1,1)(x,p)
∂p11∂p
1
2
for λ < 1.
The intuition behind the identification can be visually understood by Figure 2. For example,m(0,0)(x, p01, p02)
is the mean of the potential outcome Y (0,0)1 at point C in the figure, where the players are indifferent between
the actions D = (0, 0) and (1, 1) given that (P 01 , P 02 ) = (p01, p02) holds. Thus, a small fluctuation of (V1, V2)
around (p01, p02) can change the treatment status of a certain proportion of the players from D = (0, 0) to (1, 1)
only if λ > 0. Hence, if λ = 0, the identification fails because D = (0, 0) is never chosen at this point.
To provide a more complete explanation, we outline the proof of the result for m(0,0)(x, p01, p02). We can
observe that
ψ(0,0)(x,p) = E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ] · Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x] + λ · E[Y (0,0)1 |X = x, V ∈ Vmul] · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x]
=
∫ 1
p01
∫ 1
p02
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2 − (1− λ)
∫ p11
p01
∫ p12
p02
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2,
where the second equality follows by direct calculation. Partially differentiating both sides with respect to p01
and p02 leads to the result form(0,0)(x, p01, p02).
The above identification results are obtained by conditioning the values of all four variables (P 01 , P 11 , P 02 , P 12 ).
Recall that Theorem 3.1 required only two out of four values as the conditioning variables, since the point at
which identification is achieved is well characterized as the upper left or the lower right corner in the space
of V . By contrast, we should fix the values of all four (P 01 , P 11 , P 02 , P 12 ) under multiple equilibria because
these four points are required for characterizing the multiple equilibria region. Nonetheless, the parameter to
be identified here, namely m(0,0)(x, p01, p02), relates to only two values, p01 and p02, and it is thus irrelevant to
p11 and p12. Indeed, as shown in the next section, the computational effort required to estimatem(0,0)(x, p1, p2)
andm(1,1)(x, p1, p2) is no greater than that form(1,0)(x, p1, p2) orm(0,1)(x, p1, p2). As a result, our estimation
method alleviates the curse of dimensionality.
Remark 3.1 (Over-identification). The above theorem implies that we can achieve over-identification. For
example, assume that the conditional support of (P 01 , P 02 ) overlaps with that of (P 11 , P 12 ) given D = (0, 0);
that is, some (p1, p2) ∈ supp[P 01 , P 02 |X = x,D = (0, 0)] ∩ supp[P 11 , P 12 |X = x,D = (0, 0)] exists. Then, if
0 < λ < 1 (i.e., multiple equilibria do exist), we can identifym(0,0)(x, p1, p2) in at least two ways:
m(0,0)(x, p1, p2) =
1
λh(p1, p2|x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x, p1, p
1
1, p2, p
1
2)
∂p1∂p2
= − 1
(1− λ)h(p1, p2|x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x, p01, p1, p
0
2, p2)
∂p1∂p2
,
where (p11, p12) and (p01, p02) can be any value as long as they are consistent with the value of (p1, p2). Based on
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this, we can improve the estimation efficiency, as discussed in Remark 4.2. This advantage of over-identification
would be viewed as reminiscent of the findings in the game econometrics literature (e.g., de Paula and Tang,
2012; de Paula, 2013). Intuitively, when multiple equilibria between D = (0, 0) and (1, 1) exist because of
complementarity, the data exhibit a positive correlation betweenDj andD−j , and this provides more chances of
identifyingm(0,0)(x, p1, p2) andm(1,1)(x, p1, p2) than in the other two cases. Moreover, the over-identification
provides information on the validity of the assumption of strategic complementarity. This is because if the
treatment decisions are not complements but substitutes, the over-identification results form(0,0)(x, p1, p2) and
m(1,1)(x, p1, p2) do not hold; rather, similar results hold form(1,0)(x, p1, p2) andm(0,1)(x, p1, p2).
Remark 3.2 (A relationship with Lee and Salanié (2018)). The identification results obtained here are closely
related to those of Lee and Salanié (2018), who consider the identification of models where the treatment
realizations follow a set of threshold crossing rules. To clarify the difference between our study and theirs,
let V˜ := (V˜1, V˜2, V˜3, V˜4, V˜5), where V˜1 = V1, V˜2 = V2, V˜3 = V1, V˜4 = V2, and V˜5 = . Further, let Q :=
(Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4, Q5), where Q1 = P 01 , Q2 = P 02 , Q3 = P 11 , Q4 = P 12 , and Q5 = λ, and ∂q := ∂5/
∏5
j=1 ∂qj
be the differential operator with q = (q1, q2, q3, q4, q5). Then, the treatment choice for each pair can be uniquely
determined by a set of threshold crossing rules defined by V˜ and Q. Theorem 3.1 in Lee and Salanié (2018)
implies that
E[Y (0,0)|X = x, V˜ = q] = ∂qE[I
(0,0)Y |X = x,Q = q]
∂q Pr[D = (0, 0)|X = x,Q = q] .
The above result is based on the partial derivatives with respect to all thresholds q. Thus, when directly based on
this, the resulting estimator would suffer from the curse of dimensionality. Another notable difference is that the
over-identifiability of the MTR functions is obscured in their framework because they focus on the identification
of the MTR functions conditional on all the unobservables involved in the threshold crossing criteria.
3.2 Identification of the MTE parameters
Given the results in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, the identification of the MTE parameters is rather straightforward.
Firstly, for the indirect MTE, we note the following equalities:
τ
(0)
indirect(x, p1, p2) = τtotal(x, p1, p2)− τ (1)direct(x, p1, p2),
τ
(1)
indirect(x, p1, p2) = τtotal(x, p1, p2)− τ (0)direct(x, p1, p2).
Thus, to identify the indirect MTE, it is sufficient to discuss only the identification of the direct MTE and total
MTE. Moreover, for the direct MTE, we focus below only on the case of d2 = 0 for exposition purposes.
From Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, assuming that λ < 1, we can write the direct MTE as
τ
(0)
direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) = −
1
h(p01, p
1
2|x)
∂2
∂p01∂p
1
2
(
ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) +
ψ(0,0)(x,p)
1− λ
)
.
Recall that the value of ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p12) cannot be identified from the data if (p01, p12) 6∈ supp[P 01 , P 12 |X =
x,D = (1, 0)]. Similarly, if p 6∈ supp[P|X = x,D = (0, 0)], ψ(0,0)(x,p) is not obtained. However, as p11 and
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p02 are irrelevant to the value ofm(0,0)(x, p01, p12), they can take any values as long as (p01, p12) ∈ supp[P 01 , P 12 |X =
x,D = (0, 0)]. Consequently, the identification of this MTE parameter requires that the support of (P 01 , P 12 )
for players satisfying D = (1, 0) overlaps with that of (P 01 , P 12 ) for players satisfying D = (0, 0) conditional
on X = x. In practice, the observations for which (P 01 , P 12 ) is not contained in the common support should be
dropped when the MTE is computed.
For identification of the total MTE, assuming that λ > 0, we have
τtotal(x, p
0
1, p
0
2) = −
1
λh(p01, p
0
2|x)
∂2
∂p01∂p
0
2
(
ψ(1,1)(x,p) + ψ(0,0)(x,p)
)
.
In this case, the conditional support of (P 01 , P 02 ) for D = (1, 1) and that for D = (0, 0) must overlap.
4 Estimation and Asymptotics
In this section, a two-step semiparametric procedure is proposed for estimating the MTE parameters given the
data {{(Yji, Dji,Wji)}2j=1}ni=1 are observed. We first describe the estimation procedure in Section 4.1 and then
present the technical details for the estimation, including its asymptotic properties and inference procedures in
Section 4.2. We introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1.
(i) Each player j decides his/her treatment by
Dji = 1
(
W>ji γ0 +D−j,i · η(W>ji γ1) ≥ εji
)
, i = 1, . . . , n,
where γ := (γ>0 , γ>1 )> ∈ R2dim(W ) is a vector of the parameters and η(·) is a known positive function.
(ii) supp[W ] is a compact subset of R2dim(W ) and S(1,0) := supp[P 01 , P 12 |D = (1, 0)] is a closed convex
proper subset of [0, 1]2.
(iii) The random variables ε = (ε1, ε2) are independent of W and continuously distributed on the whole R2
with the marginal CDFs Fε1(·) and Fε2(·), respectively. Their joint distribution is represented by a copula
H(·, ·; ρ) such that Pr(ε1 ≤ a1, ε2 ≤ a2) = H(Fε1(a1), Fε2(a2); ρ), where ρ ∈ [cρ, c¯ρ] is a correlation
parameter between ε1 and ε2 and cρ and c¯ρ are real numbers whose values depend on the choice of the
copula function. The copula H(·, ·; ρ) has a density function h(·, ·; ρ).
In Assumption 4.1(i), we assume a parametric model with a strictly positive interaction effect η(·) > 0
to ensure strategic complementarity as in Assumption 2.1. In the literature, it has typically been assumed
that the interaction effect is a constant value, except for some recent studies (e.g., Kline, 2015). However,
such a model specification cannot be adopted here because the constancy of the interaction effect implies that
the conditional support of P 1j given P 0j degenerates to a singleton. We also assume that the coefficients γ
are common to both players for simplicity. In Assumption 4.1(iii), we assume that the error terms (ε1, ε2)
are supported on the whole R2 and that their joint distribution function is known up to a parameter ρ. In
conjunction with the first part of Assumption 4.1(ii), the full support condition ensures that the log-likelihood
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function (defined below) is well defined for any finite γ and ρ ∈ [cρ, c¯ρ]. A typical example satisfying this
assumption is a standard bivariate normal distribution. In this case, the copula H corresponds to the Gaussian
copula H(v1, v2; ρ) = Φ2(Φ−1(v1),Φ−1(v2); ρ), where Φ2(·, ·; ρ) is the standard bivariate normal CDF with
correlation ρ, and Φ(·) denotes the standard normal CDF. As another example, Aradillas-Lopez (2010) uses the
Farlie–Gumbel–Morgenstern (FGM) copulaH(v1, v2; ρ) = v1v2[1 + ρ(1− v1)(1− v2)] in a context similar to
ours. Importantly, as recently shown by Khan and Nekipelov (2018), when the marginal CDFs of (ε1, ε2) are
unknown, it is generally impossible to estimate the interaction effect at the parametric rate n−1/2.
To facilitate the analysis, we assume a linear model for the potential outcomes. The following assumption
requires that the unobservables are independent of the covariates and instruments, which is a popular setup in
the literature (e.g., Carneiro and Lee, 2009).
Assumption 4.2.
(i) For each player j, the potential outcome Y (dj ,d−j)ji is additively separable in the unobservable, such that
Y
(dj ,d−j)
ji = X
>
jiβ
(dj ,d−j)
j + U
(dj ,d−j)
ji , i = 1, . . . , n,
where β(dj ,d−j)j ∈ Rdim(X) is a vector of the parameters.
(ii) The random variables U (d1,d2) = (U (d1,d2)1 , U
(d2,d1)
2 ) are independent ofW for all (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2.
4.1 Two-step estimation
First step: Estimation of the treatment decision game. We first estimate the parameters of the treatment
decision model using the ML method. In accordance with the definitions in (2.4), we let Vji = Fεj (εji),
P 0ji(γ) = Fεj (W
>
ji γ0), P 1ji(γ) = Fεj (W>ji γ0 + η(W>ji γ1)), and Pi(γ) = (P 01i(γ), P 11i(γ), P 02i(γ), P 12i(γ)). Let
θ := (γ>, ρ, λ)> be the vector of the parameters to be estimated. Then, for a given θ, the conditional probability
that the i-th pair of players is in the multiple equilibria region is given by
Lmul(Pi(γ); θ) := H(P 11i(γ), P 12i(γ); ρ)−H(P 11i(γ), P 02i(γ); ρ)−H(P 01i(γ), P 12i(γ); ρ) +H(P 01i(γ), P 02i(γ); ρ).
Further, letting the probability that they choose an action Di = (d1, d2) be L(d1,d2)(Pi(γ); θ), we have
L(1,0)(Pi(γ); θ) = P 01i(γ)−H(P 01i(γ), P 12i(γ); ρ), L(1,1)(Pi(γ); θ) = H(P 11i(γ), P 12i(γ); ρ)− λ · Lmul(Pi(γ); θ),
L(0,1)(Pi(γ); θ) = P 02i(γ)−H(P 11i(γ), P 02i(γ); ρ), L(0,0)(Pi(γ); θ) = 1−
∑
(d1,d2)6=(0,0) L(d1,d2)(Pi(γ); θ).
(4.1)
Then, the ML estimator θ̂n maximizes the log-likelihood function
∑n
i=1 `i(θ) with respect to θ, where
`i(θ) :=
1∑
d1=0
1∑
d2=0
I
(d1,d2)
i logL(d1,d2)(Pi(γ); θ).
Let θ∗ = (γ∗>, ρ∗, λ∗)> be the true value of θ. Once the ML estimator θ̂n is obtained, we can estimate
P 0ji = P
0
ji(γ
∗) and P 1ji = P 1ji(γ∗) by P̂ 0ji = P 0ji(γ̂n) and P̂ 1ji = P 1ji(γ̂n), respectively. Similarly, the true
joint CDF and true joint density of (V1, V2), H(·, ·) = H(·, ·; ρ∗) and h(·, ·) = h(·, ·; ρ∗), can be estimated as
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Ĥ(·, ·) = H(·, ·; ρ̂n) and ĥ(·, ·) = h(·, ·; ρ̂n). Moreover, we can estimate the probabilities in (4.1) evaluated at
the true θ∗, namely L(d1,d2)i = L(d1,d2)(Pi; θ∗) and Lmul,i = Lmul(Pi; θ∗), by L̂(d1,d2)i = L(d1,d2)(P̂i; θ̂n) and
L̂mul,i = Lmul(P̂i; θ̂n), respectively, where P̂i = (P̂ 01i, P̂ 11i, P̂ 02i, P̂ 12i).
Second step: Estimation of the MTEs. As discussed in Section 3, a variety of treatment effect parameters
can be identified. Below, in parallel with Section 3.2, we specifically discuss the estimation of the direct MTE
τ
(0)
direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) and total MTE τtotal(x, p01, p02).
Recall that the direct MTE τ (0)direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) is the difference between the MTR functions m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
and m(0,0)(x, p01, p12). We first discuss estimating the MTR function for D = (1, 0). Assumption 4.2 implies
that
m(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) = x
>
1 β
(1,0)
1 + E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12].
Since U (1,0)1 may be correlated with (V1, V2), E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1, V2] 6= 0 in general. Observe that
E[I(1,0)Y1|I(1,0), X, P 01 , P 12 ] = I(1,0)X>1 β(1,0)1 + I(1,0)E[U (1,0)1 |I(1,0) = 1, X, P 01 , P 12 ]
= I(1,0)X>1 β
(1,0)
1 + I
(1,0)E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 ≤ P 01 , V2 > P 12 ].
Letting g(1,0)1 (p01, p12) :=
∫ p01
0
∫ 1
p12
E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = v1, V2 = v2]h(v1, v2)dv1dv2, the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 3.1 can show that E[U (1,0)1 |V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12] = g(1,0)1 (p01, p12)/L(1,0)(p01, p12; θ∗). We thus
obtain the following semiparametric partially linear regression model similar to the one in Newey (2009):
I(1,0)Y1 = I
(1,0)X>1 β
(1,0)
1 + T
(1,0)g
(1,0)
1 (P
0
1 , P
1
2 ) + e
(1,0)
1 , (4.2)
where T (1,0) = T (1,0)(P 01 , P 12 ) := I(1,0)/L(1,0)(P 01 , P 12 ; θ∗) and E[e(1,0)1 |I(1,0), X, P 01 , P 12 ] = 0 by construc-
tion. Based on (4.2), we estimate the coefficient β(1,0)1 and the unknown function g
(1,0)
1 (·, ·) using the series
(sieve) method.6 Let bK(p1, p2) := (b1K(p1, p2), . . . , bKK(p1, p2))> be a K × 1 vector of bivariate basis
functions, such as bivariate power series or tensor-product B-splines. We assume that g(1,0)1 (·, ·) can be well
approximated by a linear combination of the basis functions, i.e., g(1,0)1 (·, ·) ≈ bK(·, ·)>α(1,0)1 for some coef-
ficient vector α(1,0)1 with sufficiently large K (a formal statement is given in Assumption 4.7). Based on the
series approximation and estimators in the first step, letting T̂ (1,0)i := T̂ (1,0)(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i) = I
(1,0)
i /L̂(1,0)i , we have
I
(1,0)
i Y1i ≈ I(1,0)i X>1iβ(1,0)1 + T̂ (1,0)i bK(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)>α(1,0)1 + e(1,0)1i .
Let β̂(1,0)1n and α̂
(1,0)
1n be the least squares estimators obtained by regressing I
(1,0)
i Y1i on (I
(1,0)
i X1i, T̂
(1,0)
i bK(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)).
Then, the estimator of g(1,0)1 (p01, p12) can be obtained by ĝ
(1,0)
1 (p
0
1, p
1
2) := bK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>α̂(1,0)1n . For the estimation
of E[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12], applying the same argument as in Theorem 3.1 yields
E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] = −
1
h(p01, p
1
2)
∂2g
(1,0)
1 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
.
6 Compared with the widely used kernel smoothing method, the series method has the advantage of computational simplicity. The
advantage becomes rather prominent for the cases ofD = (0, 0) and (1, 1), as discussed below.
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Thus, by replacing the unknown parameters by their estimators, we can estimateE[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] by
Ên[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] := −
1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
∂2ĝ
(1,0)
1 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
= − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>α̂(1,0)1n ,
(4.3)
where b¨K(p1, p2) := ∂2bK(p1, p2)/(∂p1∂p2). Finally, the MTR functionm(1,0)(x, p01, p12) can be estimated by
m̂(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) := x
>
1 β̂
(1,0)
1n + Ên[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12]. (4.4)
Next, we describe the estimation ofm(0,0)(x, p01, p12). As above, we have
m(0,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) = x
>
1 β
(0,0)
1 + E[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12],
under Assumption 4.2, and
E[I(0,0)Y1|I(0,0), X,P] = I(0,0)X>1 β(0,0)1 + E[I(0,0)U (0,0)1 |I(0,0), X,P]
= I(0,0)X>1 β
(0,0)
1 + I
(0,0)E[U
(0,0)
1 |I(0,0) = 1,P].
Further, if E[U (0,0)1 |V1 = v1, V2 = v2]h(v1, v2) is continuous in (v1, v2), the same argument as in the proof of
Theorem 3.2 ensures the existence of the bivariate real-valued functions g(0,0)11 , g
(0,0)
12 , g
(0,0)
13 , and g
(0,0)
14 satisfying
L(0,0)(p; θ∗) · E[U (0,0)1 |I(0,0) = 1,P = p]
= E[U
(0,0)
1 |V ∈ V(0,0)uni (p)] · Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni (p)] + λ · E[U (0,0)1 |V ∈ Vmul(p)] · Pr[V ∈ Vmul(p)]
=
∫ 1
p01
∫ 1
p02
E[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = v1, V2 = v2]h(v1, v2)dv1dv2 − (1− λ)
∫ p11
p01
∫ p12
p02
E[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = v1, V2 = v2]h(v1, v2)dv1dv2
= g
(0,0)
11 (p
0
1, p
0
2) + g
(0,0)
12 (p
1
1, p
0
2) + g
(0,0)
13 (p
0
1, p
1
2) + g
(0,0)
14 (p
1
1, p
1
2).
(4.5)
Hence, similarly to (4.2), we obtain the following semiparametric partially linear additive regression model:
I(0,0)Y1 = I
(0,0)X>1 β
(0,0)
1 + T
(0,0)g
(0,0)
11 (P
0
1 , P
0
2 ) + T
(0,0)g
(0,0)
12 (P
1
1 , P
0
2 )
+ T (0,0)g
(0,0)
13 (P
0
1 , P
1
2 ) + T
(0,0)g
(0,0)
14 (P
1
1 , P
1
2 ) + e
(0,0)
1 ,
(4.6)
where T (0,0) = T (0,0)(P) := I(0,0)/L(0,0)(P; θ∗) andE[e(0,0)1 |I(0,0), X,P] = 0 holds by construction. Assum-
ing again that each g(0,0)1l (·, ·) can be approximated by g(0,0)1l (·, ·) ≈ bK(·, ·)>α(0,0)1l for a coefficient vector α(0,0)1l
and replacing T (0,0) and P with their estimators T̂ (0,0) := I(0,0)/L̂(0,0) and P̂, respectively, β(0,0)1 and α(0,0)1l ’s
can be estimated by a least squares regression.7 Let β̂(0,0)1n and α̂
(0,0)
1ln be the resulting least squares estimators.
7 It is possible to use different orders of basis terms to approximate each component of the functions g(0,0)1l ’s for l = 1, . . . 4, but
we use the same orderK for all, for simplicity. Also note that the “locations” of the functions g(0,0)1l ’s are not identified without further
restrictions. To handle this in practice, we may include an intercept term in only one of the basis terms for g(0,0)1l ’s. To simplify our
presentation, we postulate that such a normalization is made implicitly.
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Then, each g(0,0)1l (p1, p2) can be estimated by ĝ
(0,0)
1l (p1, p2) := bK(p1, p2)
>α̂(0,0)1ln . Moreover, Theorem 3.2 and
(4.5) imply that
E[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] =
1
(1− λ)h(p01, p12)
∂2g
(0,0)
13 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
,
and thus we can estimate E[U (0,0)1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] by
Ên[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12] :=
1
(1− λ̂n)ĥ(p01, p12)
∂2ĝ
(0,0)
13 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
=
1
(1− λ̂n)ĥ(p01, p12)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>α̂(0,0)13n .
(4.7)
Consequently, the MTR functionm(0,0)(x, p01, p12) can be estimated by
m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) := x
>
1 β̂
(0,0)
1n + Ên[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12]. (4.8)
The above estimator is based on the identification at the upper left corner (point A in Figure 2), and the estimation
at the other points is analogous.
Finally, from (4.4) and (4.8), the direct MTE τ (0)direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) can be estimated by
τ̂
(0)
direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) := m̂
(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)− m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p12). (4.9)
We can estimate the total MTE τtotal(x, p01, p02) = m(1,1)(x, p01, p02)−m(0,0)(x, p01, p02) in the same manner
as above. The estimator ofm(0,0)(x, p01, p02) can be obtained by
m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p
0
2) := x
>
1 β̂
(0,0)
1n + Ên[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p02], (4.10)
where
Ên[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p02] :=
1
λ̂nĥ(p01, p
0
2)
∂2ĝ
(0,0)
11 (p
0
1, p
0
2)
∂p01∂p
0
2
=
1
λ̂nĥ(p01, p
0
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
0
2)
>α̂(0,0)11n .
For the estimation ofm(1,1)(x, p01, p02), we first estimate the following partially linear additive regression model:
I(1,1)Y1 = I
(1,1)X>1 β
(1,1)
1 + T
(1,1)g
(1,1)
11 (P
0
1 , P
0
2 ) + T
(1,1)g
(1,1)
12 (P
1
1 , P
0
2 )
+ T (1,1)g
(1,1)
13 (P
0
1 , P
1
2 ) + T
(1,1)g
(1,1)
14 (P
1
1 , P
1
2 ) + e
(1,1)
1 ,
(4.11)
where T (1,1) = T (1,1)(P) := I(1,1)/L(1,1)(P; θ∗) and E[e(1,1)1 |I(1,1), X,P] = 0. Using the series approxi-
mation g(1,1)1l (·, ·) ≈ bK(·, ·)>α(1,1)1l , the same estimation procedure as above gives the least squares estimator
(β̂
(1,1)
1n , α̂
(1,1)
1ln ) of (β
(1,1)
1 , α
(1,1)
1l ). Then, g
(1,1)
1l (·, ·) can be estimated by ĝ(1,1)1l (·, ·) := bK(·, ·)>α̂(1,1)1ln . Thus, we
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can estimatem(1,1)(x, p01, p02) by
m̂(1,1)(x, p01, p
0
2) := x
>
1 β̂
(1,1)
1n + Ên[U
(1,1)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p02], (4.12)
where
Ên[U
(1,1)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p02] := −
1
λ̂nĥ(p01, p
0
2)
∂2ĝ
(1,1)
11 (p
0
1, p
0
2)
∂p01∂p
0
2
= − 1
λ̂nĥ(p01, p
0
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
0
2)
>α̂(1,1)11n .
Finally, the total MTE τtotal(x, p01, p02) can be estimated by
τ̂total(x, p
0
1, p
0
2) := m̂
(1,1)(x, p01, p
0
2)− m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p02). (4.13)
Remark 4.1 (Practical recommendations). The Monte Carlo simulation results presented in Appendix F show
that when the sample size is not large, using a bivariate power series achieves a smaller RMSE (root mean
squared error) than the tensor-product B-splines for the sieve space. In addition, for small samples, we find that
theMTE parameters can bemore precisely estimated by employing a ridge regression with a small regularization
parameter (e.g., a regularization parameter of order n−1). Hence, for practical situations with relatively small
samples, we recommend employing regularized regression techniques with a bivariate power series in the
second-stage estimation. Note that introducing a sufficiently small regularization parameter does not alter our
asymptotic results presented below. For more details about the Monte Carlo experiments, see Appendix F.
4.2 Asymptotics
In this subsection, we derive the asymptotic properties of the proposed estimators and discuss inference
procedures based on them. We mainly investigate the estimator of the MTR function forD = (1, 0). Analogous
arguments apply to the other cases.
Assumption 4.3.
(i) ‖θ̂n − θ∗‖ = OP (n−1/2).
(ii) The CDFsFεj (·) for j = 1, 2 and the interaction function η(·) are continuously differentiable with bounded
derivatives.
(iii) H(p1, p2; ρ) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2 and ρ in the neighborhood of ρ∗.
(iv) h(p1, p2; ρ) is continuous in (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2, bounded away from zero uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0),
and Lipschitz continuous with respect to ρ in the neighborhood of ρ∗.
Assumption 4.3(i) is the
√
n-consistency of the ML estimator θ̂n. It is a high-level condition; however,
it is a standard result for the parametric ML estimation given that θ∗ is globally identified (e.g., Rothenberg,
1971). Since the identification of discrete game models is itself an important research area, we formally state
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the identification conditions for our model in Appendix D. Assumption 4.3(iv) implies that ĥ(·, ·) is uniformly
bounded away from zero and infinity with probability approaching one (w.p.a.1) in conjunction with (i).
Let Y(1,0)1 := (I
(1,0)
1 Y11, . . . , I
(1,0)
n Y1n)
> and X(1,0)1 := (I
(1,0)
1 X11, . . . , I
(1,0)
n X1n)
>. Define T(1,0) =
diag(T (1,0)1 , . . . , T
(1,0)
n ), T̂(1,0) = diag(T̂ (1,0)1 , . . . , T̂
(1,0)
n ), and
b
(1,0)
K :=
(
bK
(
P 011, P
1
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P 01n, P
1
2n
))>
, b̂
(1,0)
K :=
(
bK
(
P̂ 011, P̂
1
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P̂ 01n, P̂
1
2n
))>
,
R
(1,0)
K :=
(
X
(1,0)
1 ,T
(1,0)b
(1,0)
K
)
, R̂
(1,0)
K :=
(
X
(1,0)
1 , T̂
(1,0)b̂
(1,0)
K
)
.
Then, our feasible estimator of δ(1,0)1 := (β
(1,0)>
1 , α
(1,0)>
1 )
> is given by (4.14):
δ̂
(1,0)
1n =
(
β̂
(1,0)>
1n , α̂
(1,0)>
1n
)>
:=
[
R̂
(1,0)>
K R̂
(1,0)
K
]−
R̂
(1,0)>
K Y
(1,0)
1 , (4.14)
δ˜
(1,0)
1n =
(
β˜
(1,0)>
1n , α˜
(1,0)>
1n
)>
:=
[
R
(1,0)>
K R
(1,0)
K
]−
R
(1,0)>
K Y
(1,0)
1 , (4.15)
where δ˜(1,0)1n is an infeasible estimator with the true parameters in the first stage being treated as known. The
infeasible version of the estimators of g(1,0)1 (p01, p12), E[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12], and m(1,0)(x, p01, p12) can
be defined similarly, which we denote by g˜(1,0)1 (p01, p12), E˜n[U
(1,0)
1 |V1 = p01, V2 = p12], and m˜(1,0)(x, p01, p12),
respectively.
Define RK(P 01 , P 12 ) := (I(1,0)X>1 , T (1,0)bK(P 01 , P 12 )>)> and
Ψ
(1,0)
K := E
[
RK(P
0
1 , P
1
2 )RK(P
0
1 , P
1
2 )
>
]
, Ψ
(1,0)
nK := R
(1,0)>
K R
(1,0)
K /n, Ψ̂
(1,0)
nK := R̂
(1,0)>
K R̂
(1,0)
K /n,
Σ
(1,0)
K := E
[(
e
(1,0)
1
)2
RK(P
0
1 , P
1
2 )RK(P
0
1 , P
1
2 )
>
]
.
Assumption 4.4. The data {{(Yji, Dji, Xji, Zji)}2j=1}ni=1 are independent and identically distributed across i.
Assumption 4.5.
(i) There exist positive constants cΨ and c¯Ψ such that, uniformly inK,
0 < cΨ ≤ χmin
(
Ψ
(1,0)
K
)
≤ χmax
(
Ψ
(1,0)
K
)
≤ c¯Ψ <∞.
(ii) There exist positive constants cΣ and c¯Σ such that, uniformly inK,
0 < cΣ ≤ χmin
(
Σ
(1,0)
K
)
≤ χmax
(
Σ
(1,0)
K
)
≤ c¯Σ <∞.
Assumption 4.6. E[(e(1,0)1 )4|W,D] is bounded.
Assumption 4.4 is a standard and relatively weak condition for microeconomic applications. We do not
restrict the dependence between the variables for j and those for −j. Assumption 4.5(i) is a non-singularity
condition that ensures the existence of the inverse matrices [Ψ(1,0)nK ]
−1 and [Ψ̂(1,0)nK ]
−1 w.p.a.1. Assumption 4.6
is introduced to conveniently derive the limiting distribution of our estimator.
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To state the next assumption, we introduce the following notation. For a sufficiently smooth function
g(p1, p2) and a vector of non-negative integers a = (a1, a2), let
∂ag(p1, p2) :=
∂|a|g(p1, p2)
∂a1p1∂a2p2
,
where |a| = a1 + a2. If |a| = 0, then ∂ag(p1, p2) = g(p1, p2).
Assumption 4.7. For some integer s ≥ 2, the functions g(1,0)1 (·, ·) and bK(·, ·) are at least s-times continuously
differentiable, and there exists some fixed α(1,0)1 ∈ RK such that
sup
(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣∂ag(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− ∂abK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1 ∣∣∣ = O (K(|a|−s)/2) .
Assumption 4.7 clearly restricts the smoothness of g(1,0)1 (·, ·) and choice of the basis functions. For
example, Lemma 2 in Holland (2017) shows that when g(1,0)1 (·, ·) is s-times continuously differentiable on
[0, 1]2, Assumption 4.7 is satisfied by tensor-product B-splines of order r (degree r − 1) for r − 2 ≥ s. For
slightly more refined results, when g(1,0)1 (·, ·) is in a Hölder space of smoothness s, B-splines, wavelets, and
Cattaneo and Farrell’s local polynomial partitioning series can satisfy Assumption 4.7 (for details, see Chen
and Christensen, 2018, Corollary 3.1, and Cattaneo and Farrell, 2013, Lemma A.2).
Assumption 4.8. As n→∞, (i) ζ0(K)
√
(logK)/n→ 0, and (ii) ζ1(K)/
√
n→ 0, where
ζd(K) := max|a|≤d
sup
(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
‖∂abK(p1, p2)‖.
Assumption 4.8(i) is used to prove the convergence of the matrix Ψ(1,0)nK to Ψ
(1,0)
K and 4.8(ii) is additionally
introduced to ensure the convergence of Ψ̂(1,0)nK to Ψ
(1,0)
K . Assumptions similar to the latter have often been
employed in the literature on semiparametric two-step series estimation (e.g., Lee, 2007; Newey, 2009; Hoshino,
2018). The bound of ζ0(K) is well known for several basis functions, which is typically ζ0(K) = O(
√
K)
(e.g., Chen, 2007; Belloni et al., 2015). By contrast, there are fewer readily available results for the bound
of ζ1(K). For example, Cattaneo and Farrell’s local polynomial partitioning series satisfies ζ1(K) = O(K)
(see Cattaneo and Farrell, 2013, Lemma A.1). In Appendix C, we show that the tensor-product B-spline also
satisfies ζ1(K) = O(K).
The following theorem presents the convergence rate of the estimators of δ(1,0)1 .
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(i)–(iii), (v), 4.4, 4.5(i), and 4.6–4.8 hold. If in addition√
nK−s/2 = O(1) holds, then we have
(i)
∥∥∥β˜(1,0)1n − β(1,0)1 ∥∥∥ = OP (n−1/2), (ii) ∥∥∥α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 ∥∥∥ = OP (√K/n),
(iii)
∥∥∥β̂(1,0)1n − β(1,0)1 ∥∥∥ = OP (n−1/2), (iv) ∥∥∥α̂(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 ∥∥∥ = OP (√K/n).
For the estimators of β(1,0)1 , in addition to the
√
n-consistency, it is possible to derive their asymptotic
normality under an additional “undersmoothing” condition ensuring that the series approximation bias is of
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order o(n−1/2). The asymptotic distribution of β̂(1,0)1n has a more complicated and larger asymptotic variance
than that of the infeasible estimator β˜(1,0)1n (cf. Newey and McFadden, 1994, Section 6). As our primary goal is
to estimate the MTEs, we do not discuss any further the asymptotic distribution of the estimators of β(1,0)1 .
We move on to the nonparametric part. Let PnK and P̂nK be the empirical projection operators onto the
(weighted) sieve space, namely
PnK [g(p1, p2)] = bK(p1, p2)>SK
[
Ψ
(1,0)
nK
]−1 1
n
n∑
i=1
RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i)g(P
0
1i, P
1
2i),
P̂nK [g(p1, p2)] = bK(p1, p2)>SK
[
Ψ̂
(1,0)
nK
]−1 1
n
n∑
i=1
RK(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)g(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i),
where SK := (0K×dim(X), IK). We define the sup-operator norm of PnK restricted to S(1,0) as
‖PnK‖∞,S(1,0) := sup
{
sup(p1,p2)∈S(1,0) |PnK [g(p1, p2)]|
sup(p1,p2)∈S(1,0) |g(p1, p2)|
: g ∈ L∞(S(1,0)), sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
|g(p1, p2)| 6= 0
}
,
where L∞(S(1,0)) is the space of uniformly bounded functions on S(1,0). The sup norm of the operator P̂nK
is similarly defined.
Assumption 4.9. (i) ‖PnK‖∞,S(1,0) = OP (1). (ii) ‖P̂nK‖∞,S(1,0) = OP (1).
Assumption 4.10. For anyα ∈ RK , sup(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∂abK(p1, p2)>α∣∣ = O(K |a|/2) sup(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2 ∣∣bK(p1, p2)>α∣∣.
Assumption 4.9 is another condition that restricts the choice of the basis functions. Huang (2003) shows that
a similar condition to Assumption 4.9(i) holds true for spline bases under some mild regularity conditions. In
addition, wavelets can satisfy such a condition, as shown in Theorem 5.2 in Chen and Christensen (2015). For
the verification of Assumption 4.9(ii), see Appendix C. In the proof of Corollary 3.1 in Chen and Christensen
(2018), it is shown that Assumption 4.10 holds for splines and wavelets.
Assumption 4.11.
(i) There exist finite constants cb > 0 and ω ≥ 0 such that ‖bK(p1, p2) − bK(p′1, p′2)‖ ≤ cbKω‖(p1, p2) −
(p′1, p′2)‖ for all (p1, p2), (p′1, p′2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
(ii) ζ20 (K)
√
(log n)/n→ 0.
The next theorem establishes the uniform convergence rate of the estimators for the MTR function.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1–4.4, 4.5(i), and 4.6–4.11 hold. Then, we have
(i) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣m˜(1,0)(x, p1, p2)−m(1,0)(x, p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)K√log n/n) +OP (K(2−s)/2),
(ii) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣m̂(1,0)(x, p1, p2)−m(1,0)(x, p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)K√log n/n) +OP (K(2−s)/2).
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The proof of the theorem is straightforward from results (i) and (iii) in Theorem 4.1 and Lemma B.4, and
thus it is omitted. When ζ0(K) 
√
K, by choosingK  (log n/n)−1/(1+s), we can obtain
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣m̂(1,0)(x, p1, p2)−m(1,0)(x, p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP ((log n/n) s−22s+2) .
The above result implies that our MTR estimator can converge at the optimal uniform rate of Stone (1982).
This fact is consistent with the finding recently reported by Chen and Christensen (2018), who prove that series
least-squares estimators achieve the optimal uniform rate for estimating the derivatives of a nonparametric
function by appropriately choosing the basis function.
The next theorem shows that the asymptotic distribution of the feasible estimator for the MTR function
m(1,0)(x, p1, p2) is equivalent to that of the infeasible oracle estimator.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1–4.11 hold. For a given (p01, p12) ∈ S(1,0), if in addition
K/‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ → 0, ζ0(K)
√
K/n→ 0, √nK(2−s)/2 = O(1), and ζ0(K)ζ1(K)/
√
n = O(1) hold, then we
have
(i)
√
n
(
m˜(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
d→ N(0, 1),
(ii)
√
n
(
m̂(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
d→ N(0, 1),
where
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2) :=
√
b¨K(p01, p
1
2)
>SK
[
Ψ
(1,0)
K
]−1
Σ
(1,0)
K
[
Ψ
(1,0)
K
]−1
S>K b¨K(p01, p12)
h(p01, p
1
2)
.
The standard deviation σ(1,0)K (p
0
1, p
1
2) can be easily estimated by a sample analog, replacing the true values
and functions with their estimates. Specifically, it can be estimated by
σ̂
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2) :=
√
b¨K(p01, p
1
2)
>SK
[
Ψ̂
(1,0)
nK
]−
Σ̂
(1,0)
nK
[
Ψ̂
(1,0)
nK
]−
S>K b¨K(p01, p12)
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
,
where Σ̂(1,0)nK := n
−1∑n
i=1(ê
(1,0)
1i )
2RK(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)RK(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)
> with ê(1,0)1i := I
(1,0)
i Y1i − I(1,0)i X>1iβ̂(1,0)1n −
T̂
(1,0)
i ĝ
(1,0)
1 (P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i).
Under conditions similar to those in Theorem 4.3, we can also show the asymptotic properties of the
estimators for D = (0, 0) and D = (1, 1). To state them, we formally describe the estimator of the MTR
function with D = (0, 0) in (4.8). We defineY(0,0)1 ,X
(0,0)
1 , T(0,0), and T̂(0,0) analogously above. Let
b̂
(0,0)
1K :=
(
bK
(
P̂ 011, P̂
0
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P̂ 01n, P̂
0
2n
))>
, b̂
(0,0)
2K :=
(
bK
(
P̂ 111, P̂
0
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P̂ 11n, P̂
0
2n
))>
,
b̂
(0,0)
3K :=
(
bK
(
P̂ 011, P̂
1
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P̂ 01n, P̂
1
2n
))>
, b̂
(0,0)
4K :=
(
bK
(
P̂ 111, P̂
1
21
)
, . . . , bK
(
P̂ 11n, P̂
1
2n
))>
,
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b̂
(0,0)
K :=
(
b̂
(0,0)
1K , b̂
(0,0)
2K , b̂
(0,0)
3K , b̂
(0,0)
4K
)
, R̂
(0,0)
K :=
(
X
(0,0)
1 , T̂
(0,0)b̂
(0,0)
K
)
.
Then, the estimator of δ(0,0)1 = (β
(0,0)>
1 , α
(0,0)>
11 , . . . , α
(0,0)>
14 )
> can be written as
δ̂
(0,0)
1n =
(
β̂
(0,0)>
1n , α̂
(0,0)>
11n , . . . , α̂
(0,0)>
14n
)>
:=
[
R̂
(0,0)>
K R̂
(0,0)
K
]−
R̂
(0,0)>
K Y
(0,0)
1 . (4.16)
We can express the estimator of δ(1,1)1 = (β
(1,1)>
1 , α
(1,1)>
11 , . . . , α
(1,1)>
14 )
> in a similar fashion. Then, we can
show the asymptotic normality of the estimators of the MTR functions given in (4.10) and (4.12):
√
n
(
m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p
0
2)−m(0,0)(x, p01, p02)
)
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2)
d→ N(0, 1),
√
n
(
m̂(0,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(0,0)(x, p01, p12)
)
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
d→ N(0, 1),
√
n
(
m̂(1,1)(x, p01, p
0
2)−m(1,1)(x, p01, p02)
)
σ
(1,1)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2)
d→ N(0, 1),
where the asymptotic standard deviations are given by
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2) :=
√
b¨K(p01, p
0
2)
>S1K
[
Ψ
(0,0)
K
]−1
Σ
(0,0)
K
[
Ψ
(0,0)
K
]−1
S>1K b¨K(p01, p02)
λh(p01, p
0
2)
,
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2) :=
√
b¨K(p01, p
1
2)
>S3K
[
Ψ
(0,0)
K
]−1
Σ
(0,0)
K
[
Ψ
(0,0)
K
]−1
S>3K b¨K(p01, p12)
(1− λ)h(p01, p12)
,
σ
(1,1)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2) :=
√
b¨K(p01, p
0
2)
>S1K
[
Ψ
(1,1)
K
]−1
Σ
(1,1)
K
[
Ψ
(1,1)
K
]−1
S>1K b¨K(p01, p02)
λh(p01, p
0
2)
.
Here, S1K := (0K×dim(X), IK ,0K×3K) and S3K := (0K×dim(X),0K×2K , IK ,0K×K). The definitions of the
matrices Ψ(0,0)K , Σ
(0,0)
K , Ψ
(1,1)
K , and Σ
(1,1)
K should be clear from the context.
Finally, the limiting distributions of the MTE estimators τ̂ (0)direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) and τ̂total(x, p01, p02) can be charac-
terized as follows:
√
n
(
τ̂
(0)
direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2)− τ (0)direct(x, p01, p12)
)
√[
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
]2
+
[
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
]2 d→ N(0, 1),
√
n
(
τ̂total(x, p
0
1, p
0
2)− τtotal(x, p01, p02)
)√[
σ
(1,1)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2)
]2
+
[
σ
(0,0)
K (p
0
1, p
0
2)
]2 d→ N(0, 1).
The standard errors can be easily computed as in the case for estimating σ(1,0)K (p
0
1, p
1
2). The limiting distributions
of the other MTE estimators can be derived similarly.
Remark 4.2 (An over-identified estimator). If the intersection of the supports of (P 01 , P 02 ), (P 11 , P 02 ), (P 01 , P 12 ),
and (P 11 , P 12 ) conditional on D = (0, 0) is non-empty, we may estimate the MTR functionm(0,0)(x, p1, p2) in
four ways, as shown in Theorem 3.2:
m̂
(0,0)
l (x, p1, p2) := x
>
1 β̂
(0,0)
1n + Êln[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2] for l = 1, 2, 3, 4,
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where (p1, p2) is in the intersection of the conditional supports, Êln[U
(0,0)
1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2] := κ̂lnb¨K(p1, p2)>α̂(0,0)1ln
with κ̂1n := 1/(λ̂nĥ(p1, p2)), κ̂2n = κ̂3n := 1/((1− λ̂n)ĥ(p1, p2)), and κ̂4n := −1/((1− λ̂n)ĥ(p1, p2)). Let
w := (w1, w2, w3, w4)
> ∈ [0, 1]4 be a vector of fixed weights such that ∑4l=1wl = 1. The MTR function
m(0,0)(x, p1, p2) can then be estimated by the weighted average of the four estimators:
m̂
(0,0)
over-id(x, p1, p2;w) :=
4∑
l=1
wlm̂
(0,0)
l (x, p1, p2).
In the same manner as the proof of Theorem 4.3, we can show the asymptotic distribution of this estimator:
√
n
(
m̂
(0,0)
over-id(x, p1, p2;w)−m(0,0)(x, p1, p2)
)
σ
(0,0)
over-id,K(p1, p2;w)
d−→ N(0, 1),
where [σ(0,0)over-id,K(p1, p2;w)]
2 = w>Υw, andΥ := (Υlm) is the 4×4 symmetricmatrixwith its (l,m)-th element
Υlm := κlκmb¨K(p1, p2)
>SlK [Ψ
(0,0)
K ]
−1Σ(0,0)K [Ψ
(0,0)
K ]
−1S>mK b¨K(p1, p2). Since the asymptotic variance has a
quadratic form, we can easily find the optimal weights that attain the minimum asymptotic variance in the class
of the weighted average estimators m̂(0,0)over-id(x, p1, p2;w) by quadratic programming. Although the matrix Υ is
unknown in practice, we can estimate the optimal weights by minimizing w>Υ̂nw with a consistent estimator
Υ̂n of Υ. The same argument as above applies to the case of D = (1, 1).
5 Empirical Application8
As an empirical illustration of our method, we estimate the impacts of risky behaviors such as smoking and
drinking alcohol on adolescents’ academic performance. An important finding in the literature is that social
interactions between close friends have a significant influence on risky behaviors by young people (e.g., Gaviria
and Raphael, 2001; Clark and Loheac, 2007; Nakajima, 2007; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007; Card and
Giuliano, 2013; Lee et al., 2014). In addition, it is reasonable to believe that peers’ risky behavior indirectly
affects one’s own academic outcome through the contextual effect. Our analytical framework can be used
effectively in such a situation.
The empirical analysis is performed on the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health)
data that provide nationally representative information on 7–12th graders in the United States. The in-school
survey was conducted during the 1994–1995 school year in a sample of 80 high schools and 52 middle schools
with some follow-up in-home interviews. The number of respondents to the in-school survey was over 90,000.
The survey elicits information on variables such as the social and demographic characteristics of the respondents,
education levels and occupations of their parents, and friendship connections.
In this analysis, similarly to Card and Giuliano (2013), we focus on the interactions among pairs of closest
8 This research uses data from Add Health, a program project directed by Kathleen Mullan Harris and designed by J. Richard Udry,
Peter S. Bearman, andKathleenMullanHarris at theUniversity ofNorthCarolina at ChapelHill, and funded by grant P01-HD31921 from
the Eunice Kennedy Shriver National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, with cooperative funding from 23 other federal
agencies and foundations. Special acknowledgment is due Ronald R. Rindfuss and Barbara Entwisle for assistance in the original design.
Information on how to obtain the Add Health data files is available on the Add Health website (http://www.cpc.unc.edu/addhealth). No
direct support was received from grant P01-HD31921 for this analysis.
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opposite-gender friends. In the in-school survey, each respondent was asked to list up to five friends of each
gender (in order from best to fifth best friend). We construct our sample of pairs in the following manner. We
first exclude missing nomination data (caused by non-response or because the nominee was not included in the
Add Health data) and identify each respondent’s closest opposite-gender friend in the available dataset. Since a
student’s closest friend’s friends might not include the student him/herself, we consider that the pair is formed
only when his/her best friend nominates him/her either in the first place or second place, except for missing
nominees. This procedure results in 7,631 opposite-gender pairs of students.
The treatment variable (Dj) is defined as the student’s participation in risky behaviors including smoking,
drinking, truancy, and fighting and the outcome variable (Yj) of interest is the student’s GPA score. Table
6 in Appendix G summarizes the explanatory variables used (Xj) and their definitions. For the choice
of instrumental variables (Zj), based on Lee et al. (2014), who find that adolescents’ smoking behavior is
significantly influenced by the contextual characteristics of their friendship networks, we construct Zj based on
the average of the selected explanatory variables over the 3rd–5th best friends of both genders. Observations
with missing values for (D,X,Z) are excluded from the analysis, and the size of the resulting sample used
in the estimation of the first-stage treatment decision model is 6,053. When estimating the MTR functions,
observations with missing values for Yj are further excluded.
Table 2 presents the empirical distribution of (D1, D2), where male students are labeled as “player 1” and
female students as “player 2.” As expected, the case of D = (0, 0) represents the largest share of our sample
(about 45% of the total). There is an interesting asymmetry between the cases of D = (1, 0) and D = (0, 1);
that is, the number of male students who solely participate in delinquent behaviors is significantly larger than
the number of such female students.
Table 2: Distribution of (D1, D2)
Male
D1 = 0 D1 = 1 Total
Female
D2 = 0 2,707 1,351 4,058
D2 = 1 736 1,259 1,995
Total 3,443 2,610 6,053
To save space, the detailed results for the estimation of the treatment decision model are omitted here and
are provided in Table 7 in Appendix G. Some noteworthy findings are as follows. Firstly, parents’ education
levels have a significant impact on reducing the student’s risky activities. Secondly, having higher grade friends
tends to encourage risky behavior. Thirdly, students who belong to a sports club are less susceptible to friends’
behavior than others. Finally, about 90% of the pairs choose D = (0, 0) in the multiple equilibria situation.
Now, we present our main results of estimating the MTE parameters. Since our sample size is not very
large, in accordance with the suggestion from the Monte Carlo results (see also Remark 4.1), we employ a
third-order bivariate power series for the basis function and use ridge regression for the parameter estimation,
with the regularization parameter set equal to n−1. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the estimated direct MTE and
total MTE, respectively. Recall that the MTE value varies with Xj . Thus, for the value of Xj , the MTEs are
evaluated at the median over all observations of men and women altogether.
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Figure 3 shows that the direct MTE is significantly negative for both male and female students. The direct
MTEs are roughly flat (partially due to the regularization) when own V is moderate. However, as own V
increases to a large value, the MTEs tend to have a weak negative slope with respect to the partner’s V . That
is, when both of the pair have stronger hesitation in participating in risky activities, the direct MTE on GPA
becomes larger. When comparing male and female students, we can observe that the impact of delinquency on
GPA is smaller for female students than male students. Interestingly, this phenomenon becomes more explicit
in the total MTE. Figure 4 illustrates that while the total MTE for female students is similar to their direct MTE,
the total MTE for male students is far lower than their direct MTE. Then, the gap between the total MTEs of
male and female students is almost one point in GPA. This result would imply that male students’ academic
performances are more easily influenced by their opposite-gender peers’ delinquent behavior than females.
Figure 3: Estimated direct MTE.
6 Conclusion
This study proposed identification and estimation methods for treatment effect models that admit both the
treatment spillover and the dependence between the treatment decisions within a pair of economic agents. We
first demonstrated that the interaction in the treatment decisions can be modeled as a binary game of complete
information with potential multiple equilibria. Treatment evaluation in the presence of strategic interaction
is a non-trivial problem because the failure of the monotonicity and presence of multiple equilibria preclude
using conventional identification strategies. Assuming an empirically reasonable equilibrium selection rule,
we showed that several treatment effect parameters such as MTE and LATE can be point-identified using an
extended version of the LIVmethod. Based on our identification results, we proposed a two-step semiparametric
series estimator for MTE parameters. We showed that the proposed MTE estimator is uniformly consistent and
asymptotic normal, and also that its limiting distribution is the same as that of the infeasible oracle estimator.
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Figure 4: Estimated total MTE.
The results of this study suggest several extensions that would be promising to investigate. Firstly, it would
be worth extending our results to the case of strategic interaction among more than two players. In the literature
on game econometrics, few studies address the identification and estimation of game models with more than two
players, primarily because the characterization of the equilibrium is highly complicated compared with the case
of two-player games. Accordingly, the direct applicability of our approach to such cases is unclear. Secondly,
it would be interesting to extend our approach to situations where players endogenously form pairs or groups
in an unobserved manner to the researcher. Our approach might be extended to such situations, in combination
with recent developments on network formation models (see de Paula, 2017). Thirdly, it may be beneficial to
develop treatment evaluation techniques under treatment decision games of incomplete information. It would
be more realistic in some situations that players do not have full information on their partner’s preferences.
Finally, while we attained the point-identification of several treatment effect parameters by explicitly assuming
an equilibrium selection rule, even when the selection rule is not explicitly specified, we may be able to establish
partial identification of the parameters as in Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) and Chesher and Rosen (2012). These
topics are left for future research.
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A Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proofs of the theorems in Section 3
A.1.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We provide the proof form(1,0)(x, p01, p12) only, as the proof form(0,1)(x, p11, p02) is analogous. From the law of
iterated expectations, the relationship (2.6) implies that
ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)
= E[I(1,0)Y1|X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12]
= E[Y
(1,0)
1 |X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12, D = (1, 0)] · Pr[D = (1, 0)|X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12]
= E[Y
(1,0)
1 |X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12, V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12] · Pr[V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12|X = x, P 01 = p01, P 12 = p12]
= E[Y
(1,0)
1 |X = x, V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12] · Pr[V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12|X = x],
where we used Assumption 3.1(i) in the last equality. Here, it holds that
E[Y
(1,0)
1 |X = x, V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12] =
1
Pr[V1 ≤ p01, V2 > p12|X = x]
∫ 1
p12
∫ p01
0
m(1,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2.
As a result, the cross-partial differentiation of ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p12) with respect to p01 and p12 leads to
ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2) =
∫ 1
p12
∫ p01
0
m(1,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2
=⇒ ∂
2ψ(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)
∂p01∂p
1
2
= −m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)h(p01, p12|x),
by the Leibniz integral rule provided that m(1,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x) is continuous in (v1, v2). Rearranging
the above equation, we obtain the desired result form(1,0)(x, p01, p12).
A.1.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We prove only the case ofm(0,0)1 (x, p01, p02), as the proofs for the other cases are similar. From the law of iterated
expectations,
ψ(0,0)(x,p) = E[I(0,0)Y1|X = x,P = p]
= E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x,P = p, D = (0, 0)] · Pr[D = (0, 0)|X = x,P = p].
For notational simplicity, we write V(0,0)uni = V(0,0)uni (p) and Vmul = Vmul(p) by suppressing the dependence on
p. As V(0,0)uni and Vmul are disjoint, by Assumptions 3.1(i) and 3.2, it holds that
E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x,P = p, D = (0, 0)]
= E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ∨ (V ∈ Vmul ∧  ≤ λ)]
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= E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ] ·
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x]
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni ∨ (V ∈ Vmul ∧  ≤ λ)|X = x]
+ E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, (V ∈ Vmul ∧  ≤ λ)] ·
Pr[(V ∈ Vmul ∧  ≤ λ)|X = x]
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni ∨ (V ∈ Vmul ∧  ≤ λ)|X = x]
= E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ] ·
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x]
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x] + λ · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x]
+ E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ Vmul] ·
λ · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x]
Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x] + λ · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x]
.
Similarly, we also have
Pr[D = (0, 0)|X = x,P = p] = Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x] + λ · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x].
As a result, we obtain
ψ(0,0)(x,p) = E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ] · Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x]
+ λ · E[Y (0,0)1 |X = x, V ∈ Vmul] · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x].
Further, it holds that
E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ V(0,0)uni ] · Pr[V ∈ V(0,0)uni |X = x]
=
∫ 1
p02
∫ 1
p01
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2 −
∫ p12
p02
∫ p11
p01
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2,
and
E[Y
(0,0)
1 |X = x, V ∈ Vmul] · Pr[V ∈ Vmul|X = x] =
∫ p12
p02
∫ p11
p01
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2.
Hence, we have
ψ(0,0)(x,p) =
∫ 1
p02
∫ 1
p01
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2 − (1− λ)
∫ p12
p02
∫ p11
p01
m(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2.
Partially differentiating both sides with respect to p01 and p02 and rearranging the equation, the Leibniz integral
rule and continuity ofm(0,0)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x) in (v1, v2) lead to the desired result:
m(0,0)(x, p01, p
0
2) =
1
λh(p01, p
0
2|x)
∂2ψ(0,0)(x,p)
∂p01∂p
0
2
.
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A.2 Proofs of the theorems in Section 4
For notational simplicity, when there is no confusion, we often suppress the superscript (1, 0) in the following
proofs. In the proofs, we often refer to the lemmas and equations in Appendix B.
Here, we introduce additional notations as follows. Let Sa be a selectionmatrix of dimension a×(dim(X)+
K) such that Saδ
(1,0)
1 is the corresponding a × 1 subvector of δ(1,0)1 . Specifically, we write SXδ(1,0)1 = β(1,0)1
and SKδ
(1,0)
1 = α
(1,0)
1 with SX = Sdim(X) := (Idim(X),0dim(X)×K) and SK := (0K×dim(X), IK). Let
e
(1,0)
1 := (e
(1,0)
11 , . . . , e
(1,0)
1n )
> be the vector of error terms in the partially linear model (4.2). Further, we define
the vectorsu(1,0)1 := g
(1,0)
1 −b(1,0)K α(1,0)1 and û(1,0)1 := ĝ(1,0)1 −b̂(1,0)K α(1,0)1 of the series approximation errorswith
g
(1,0)
1 := (g
(1,0)
1 (P
0
11, P
1
21), . . . , g
(1,0)
1 (P
0
1n, P
1
2n))
> and ĝ(1,0)1 := (g
(1,0)
1 (P̂
0
11, P̂
1
21), . . . , g
(1,0)
1 (P̂
0
1n, P̂
1
2n))
>.
Recall the definitions of the feasible and infeasible estimators δ̂(1,0)1n and δ˜
(1,0)
1n , which are given in (4.14) and
(4.15), respectively. The infeasible estimator Saδ˜
(1,0)
1n can be decomposed as follows:
Sa
(
δ˜
(1,0)
1n − δ(1,0)1
)
= SaΨ−1nKR
>
KTu1/n+ SaΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n. (A.1)
Similarly, the feasible estimator Saδ̂
(1,0)
1n has the following decomposition:
Sa
(
δ̂
(1,0)
1n − δ(1,0)1
)
= SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
KT
(
g
(1,0)
1 − ĝ(1,0)1
)
/n+ SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
K
(
T− T̂
)
ĝ
(1,0)
1 /n
+ SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
KT̂û1/n+ SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
Ke1/n.
(A.2)
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof of (i)–(ii). We first show that the first term on the right-hand side of (A.1) is of order OP (n−1/2) for
any choice of Sa. Since L(1,0)(p01, p12; θ) is bounded away from zero and unity uniformly in (p01, p12) ∈ S(1,0)
for any admissible θ, each element of T is bounded. Then, observe that
‖SaΨ−1nKR>KTu1/n‖2 = tr
{
u>1 TRKΨ
−1
nKS
>
a SaΨ−1nKR
>
KTu1
}
/n2
≤ tr
{
u>1 TRKΨ
−2
nKR
>
KTu1
}
/n2
≤ [cΨ + oP (1)]−2 · tr
{
u>1 TΨnKTu1
}
/n = OP (1) · ‖u1‖2/n,
where in the second inequality and last equality, we have used the following result:
0 < cΨ + oP (1) ≤ χmin (ΨnK) ≤ χmax (ΨnK) ≤ c¯Ψ + oP (1) <∞, w.p.a.1., (A.3)
which is implied by Lemma B.2(i) and Assumption 4.5(i). From Assumption 4.7,
‖u1‖2 ≤ n ·
[
sup
(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− bK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1 ∣∣∣
]2
= O(nK−s),
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implying that
‖SaΨ−1nKR>KTu1/n‖ = OP (K−s/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (n−1/2)
. (A.4)
For the second term in (A.1), Assumptions 4.4 and 4.6 and (A.3) imply that
E
[∥∥∥SaΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∥∥∥2∣∣∣∣{Wi, Di}ni=1] = tr{SaΨ−1nKR>KE [e1e>1 ∣∣∣{Wi, Di}ni=1]RKΨ−1nKS>a } /n2
= OP (1) · tr
{
SaΨ−1nKS
>
a
}
/n = OP (a/n) .
Hence, we have ∥∥∥SaΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∥∥∥ = OP (√a/n) , (A.5)
by Markov’s inequality. The results (i) and (ii) follow by noting that they are the cases when a = dim(X) and
a = K, respectively.
Proof of (iii)–(iv). From Lemma B.2(ii) and Assumption 4.5(i), we obtain
0 < cΨ + oP (1) ≤ χmin
(
Ψ̂nK
)
≤ χmax
(
Ψ̂nK
)
≤ c¯Ψ + oP (1) <∞, w.p.a.1. (A.6)
Then, using the same argument as in (A.4), it holds that ||SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT̂û1/n|| = OP (K−s/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (n−1/2)
for any Sa.
Further, similarly to (A.5), we have
E
[∥∥∥SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>Ke1/n∥∥∥2∣∣∣∣{Wi, Di}ni=1] = tr{SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>KE [e1e>1 ∣∣∣{Wi, Di}ni=1] R̂KΨ̂−1nKS>a } /n2
= OP (1) · tr
{
SaΨ̂−1nKS
>
a
}
/n = OP (a/n) ,
byAssumptions 4.4 and 4.6 and (A.6), which leads to ||SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>Ke1/n|| = OP (
√
a/n) byMarkov’s inequality.
Therefore, by (A.2),
Sa
(
δ̂
(1,0)
1n − δ(1,0)1
)
= SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
KT
(
g
(1,0)
1 − ĝ(1,0)1
)
/n+ SaΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
K
(
T− T̂
)
ĝ
(1,0)
1 /n+OP (
√
a/n).
(A.7)
By the mean value expansion under Assumption 4.7 and Lemma B.1, we have
g
(1,0)
1 (P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)− g(1,0)1 (P 01i, P 12i) =
{
∂g
(1,0)
1
(
P¯ 01i, P¯
1
2i
)
∂p1
+
∂g
(1,0)
1
(
P¯ 01i, P¯
1
2i
)
∂p2
}
·OP (n−1/2),
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where P¯ 01i ∈ [P̂ 01i, P 01i] and P¯ 12i ∈ [P̂ 12i, P 12i]. Thus, by the triangle inequality and (A.6), we have∥∥∥SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∥∥∥ ≤ OP (n−1/2) · {∥∥∥SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT∂1g¯(1,0)1 /n∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT∂2g¯(1,0)1 /n∥∥∥}
≤ OP (n−1/2) ·
√
tr
{
SaΨ̂−1nKS>a
}
= OP (
√
a/n),
(A.8)
where ∂j g¯
(1,0)
1 = (∂g
(1,0)
1 (P¯
0
11, P¯
1
21)/∂pj , . . . , ∂g
(1,0)
1 (P¯
0
1n, P¯
1
2n)/∂pj)
> for j = 1, 2, implying that the first
term in (A.7) is of order OP (
√
a/n). For the second term in (A.7), from (B.1), it can be easily verified that
||SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>K(T − T̂)ĝ(1,0)1 /n|| = OP (n−1/2) · ||SaΨ̂−1nKR̂>K ĝ(1,0)1 /n|| = OP (
√
a/n). This completes the
proof.
A.2.2 Proof of Theorem 4.3
To prove (i) and (ii), we first show that there exists a constant 0 < cσ <∞ such that for a given (p01, p12) ∈ S(1,0),
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2) ≥ cσ · ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖. (A.9)
By Assumptions 4.3(iv) and 4.5(ii), noting that SKS>K = IK , we observe(
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
)2
=
1
h2(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1K ΣKΨ
−1
K S
>
K b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
≥ cΣ
c¯2Ψ · h2(p01, p12)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
·‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖2,
which implies (A.9). This impliesK/σ(1,0)K (p
0
1, p
1
2)→ 0 from the assumptionK/‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ → 0.
Proof of Result (i). By the definition of the infeasible estimator m˜(1,0)(x, p01, p12), we have
m˜(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
= x>1
(
β˜
(1,0)
1n − β(1,0)1
)
− 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>
(
α˜
(1,0)
1n − α(1,0)1
)
+
1
h(p01, p
1
2)
(
∂2g
(1,0)
1 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p1∂p2
− b¨K(p01, p12)>α(1,0)1
)
= − 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>
(
α˜
(1,0)
1n − α(1,0)1
)
+OP (n
−1/2) +O(K(2−s)/2)
= A1n +A2n +OP (n
−1/2),
by Theorem 4.1(i) and Assumption 4.7, where
A1n := − 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
KTu1/n,
A2n := − 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n.
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From the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality, we have
|A1n| ≤ O(1) · ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ ·
∥∥∥SKΨ−1nKR>KTu1/n∥∥∥
= ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ ·OP (K−s/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (n−1/2)
, (A.10)
where the equality follows from (A.4). Define
A′2n := −
1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke1/n.
It is easy to see that ‖A2n −A′2n‖ ≤ O(1) · ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ · ‖SK(Ψ−1nK − Ψ−1K )R>Ke1/n‖ = ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ ·
oP (n
−1/2) by Lemma B.2(iii) and Markov’s inequality. Thus, by (A.9), we obtain
√
n
(
m˜(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
=
√
n(A1n +A2n)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
+ oP (1)
=
√
nA′2n
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
+ oP (1).
We now show the asymptotic normality of
√
nA′2n/σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2). Let
ξi := −ΠK(p01, p12)RK(P 01i, P 12i)e1i/
√
n,
where
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2) :=
[
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2) · h(p01, p12)
]−1
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1K ,
so that
∑n
i=1 ξi =
√
nA′2n/σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2). By construction, E[ξi] = 0 and E[ξ2i ] = n−1 hold. Let RK,i =
RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i) for simplicity. Then, Assumption 4.6 and the law of iterated expectations yield
E
[
ξ4i
]
= n−2E
[
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>E
[
e41,i
∣∣Wi, Di]]
≤ O(n−2) · E
[
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>
]
= O(n−2) · E
[
tr
{
RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
}]
≤ O(n−2) · χmax
(
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
)
E
[
tr
{
RK,iR
>
K,iΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)RK,iR
>
K,i
}]
≤ O(n−2) ·
[
χmax
(
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
)]2
E
[
tr
{
RK,iR
>
K,iRK,iR
>
K,i
}]
= O(ζ20 (K)K/n
2) ·
[
χmax
(
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
)]2
,
where the last equality follows from E[tr{RK,iR>K,iRK,iR>K,i}] ≤ ζ20 (K)tr{E[RK,iR>K,i]} = O(ζ20 (K)K)
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under Assumption 4.5(i). Since (A.9) and Assumption 4.3(iv) imply that
χmax
(
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
)
≤ tr
{
ΠK(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>ΠK(p01, p
1
2)
}
≤ O(1) · ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖−2 · b¨K(p01, p12)>SKΨ−2K S>K b¨K(p01, p12) = O(1),
we have
∑n
i=1E
[
ξ4i
]
= O(ζ20 (K)K/n) = o(1). Hence, result (i) follows from Lyapunov’s central limit
theorem.
Proof of Result (ii). From the definition of the feasible estimator m̂(1,0)(x, p01, p12), we have
m̂(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
= x>1
(
β̂
(1,0)
1n − β(1,0)1
)
− 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>
(
α̂
(1,0)
1n − α(1,0)1
)
+
1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
(
∂2g
(1,0)
1 (p
0
1, p
1
2)
∂p1∂p2
− b¨K(p01, p12)>α(1,0)1
)
+
(
1
h(p01, p
1
2)
− 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
)
∂2g
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)
∂p1∂p2
= − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>
(
α̂
(1,0)
1n − α(1,0)1
)
+OP (n
−1/2) +OP (K(2−s)/2)
= C1n + C2n + C3n + C4n +OP (n
−1/2),
by Theorem 4.1(iii), Assumption 4.7, and (B.4), where
C1n := − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
KT
(
g
(1,0)
1 − ĝ(1,0)1
)
/n,
C2n := − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
K
(
T− T̂
)
ĝ
(1,0)
1 /n,
C3n := − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
KT̂û1/n,
C4n := − 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
Ke1/n.
The fact that ĥ(p01, p12) > 0 w.p.a.1 and Assumption 4.10 imply that
|C1n| ≤ OP (1) ·O(K) · sup
(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣
= OP (K) ·OP
(
ζ0(K)ζ1(K)/n+ n
−1/2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (K/
√
n)
,
where the last equality follows from (B.3). Analogously, we can observe that |C2n| = OP (K/
√
n). In addition,
the same argument as in (A.10) implies that |C3n| = ‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ · oP (n−1/2). Further,
C4n = − 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n
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− 1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
(
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂
>
Ke1/n− b¨K(p01, p12)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n
)
−
(
1
ĥ(p01, p
1
2)
− 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n
= − 1
h(p01, p
1
2)
b¨K(p
0
1, p
1
2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n︸ ︷︷ ︸
=A2n
+OP (Kζ0(K)ζ1(K)/n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (K/
√
n)
+‖b¨K(p01, p12)‖ ·OP (n−1),
by Lemma B.2(ii), (B.2), (B.4), and Markov’s inequality.
Summarizing these results, we obtain
√
n
(
m̂(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)−m(1,0)(x, p01, p12)
)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
=
√
n(C1n + C2n + C3n + C4n)
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
+ oP (1)
=
√
nA2n
σ
(1,0)
K (p
0
1, p
1
2)
+ oP (1),
by (A.9). Then, the remaining part of the proof follows by the same argument as in (i).
B Appendix: Technical Lemmas
Lemma B.1. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(i), (ii), and 4.4(ii) hold. Then,
max
j∈{1,2}
max
1≤i≤n
|P̂ 0ji − P 0ji| = OP (n−1/2), max
j∈{1,2}
max
1≤i≤n
|P̂ 1ji − P 1ji| = OP (n−1/2).
Proof. We prove the result for P 0ji only, as the proof for P 1ji is similar. For any i, the mean value expansion
leads to
P̂ 0ji = P
0
ji + fεj (W
>
ji γ¯n)W
>
ji (γ̂0n − γ∗0),
where fεj is the marginal density function of εj and γ¯n ∈ [γ̂0n, γ∗0 ]. Thus, by Assumptions 4.3(i), (ii), and
4.4(ii), we have
max
1≤i≤n
|P̂ 0ji − P 0ji| ≤ max
1≤i≤n
∣∣∣fεj (W>ji γ¯n)∣∣∣ · ‖Wji‖ · ‖γ̂0n − γ∗0‖
= OP (n
−1/2),
for both j = 1 and 2.
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Lemma B.2. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(i)–(iii), 4.4, 4.5(i), and 4.8 hold. Then, we have
(i)
∥∥∥Ψ(1,0)nK −Ψ(1,0)K ∥∥∥ = OP (ζ0(K)√(logK)/n) = oP (1),
(ii)
∥∥∥Ψ̂(1,0)nK −Ψ(1,0)K ∥∥∥ = OP (ζ0(K)√(logK)/n) +OP (ζ1(K)/√n) = oP (1),
(iii)
∥∥∥∥[Ψ(1,0)nK ]−1 − [Ψ(1,0)K ]−1∥∥∥∥ = OP (ζ0(K)√(logK)/n) = oP (1),
(iv)
∥∥∥∥[Ψ̂(1,0)nK ]−1 − [Ψ(1,0)K ]−1∥∥∥∥ = OP (ζ0(K)√(logK)/n) +OP (ζ1(K)/√n) = oP (1).
Proof. (i) Let
Ξi := n
−1
(
RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i)RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i)
> − E
[
RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i)RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i)
>
])
.
By Bernstein’s inequality for random matrices (Tropp, 2012, Theorem 1.6), it holds that
Pr
(∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
Ξi
∥∥∥∥∥ ≥ tn
)
≤ exp
(
log(2dim(X) + 2K) +
−t2n/2
σ2n + tnrn/3
)
,
for any tn ≥ 0, where rn is any non-negative value such thatmax1≤i≤n ‖Ξi‖ ≤ rn, andσ2n := ‖
∑n
i=1E[ΞiΞ
>
i ]‖.
Since L(1,0)(p01, p12; θ∗) is bounded away from zero and unity uniformly in (p01, p12) ∈ S(1,0), we obtain
rn = O(ζ
2
0 (K)/n) and similarly σ2n = O(ζ20 (K)/n). The rest of the proof follows immediately from Corollary
4.1 of Chen and Christensen (2015).
(ii) The triangle inequality leads to
‖Ψ̂nK −ΨK‖ ≤ ‖Ψ̂nK −ΨnK‖+ ‖ΨnK −ΨK‖.
The second term is OP (ζ0(K)
√
(logK)/n) by (i). For the first term, the triangle inequality implies∥∥∥Ψ̂nK −ΨnK∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥(R̂>K −R>K)(R̂K −RK) /n∥∥∥+ 2 ∥∥∥R>K (R̂K −RK) /n∥∥∥ .
Assumptions 4.3(i), (iii), and Lemma B.1 yield
T̂
(1,0)
i − T (1,0)i =
I
(1,0)
i
L̂(1,0)i L(1,0)i
(
L(1,0)i − L̂(1,0)i
)
=
I
(1,0)
i
L̂(1,0)i L(1,0)i
(
P 01i − P̂ 01i −H(P 01i, P 12i; ρ∗) +H(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i; ρ̂n)
)
= OP (n
−1/2).
(B.1)
Further, the mean value expansion and Lemma B.1 lead to
bK(P̂
0
1i, P̂
1
2i)− bK(P 01i, P 12i) =
{
∂bK
(
P¯ 01i, P¯
1
2i
)
∂p1
+
∂bK
(
P¯ 01i, P¯
1
2i
)
∂p2
}
·OP (n−1/2),
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where P¯ 01i ∈ [P̂ 01i, P 01i] and P¯ 12i ∈ [P̂ 12i, P 12i]. Thus, by the triangle inequality,∥∥∥(R̂K −RK) /√n∥∥∥ ≤ ∥∥∥(T̂−T) b̂K/√n∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥T(b̂K − bK) /√n∥∥∥
≤ OP (n−1/2) ·
{∥∥∥b̂K/√n∥∥∥+ ∥∥∂1b¯K/√n∥∥+ ∥∥∂2b¯K/√n∥∥}
= OP (ζ0(K)/
√
n) +OP (ζ1(K)/
√
n) = OP (ζ1(K)/
√
n),
(B.2)
where ∂jb¯K := (∂bK(P¯ 011, P¯ 121)/∂pj , . . . , ∂bK(P¯ 01n, P¯ 12n)/∂pj)> for j = 1, 2. Hence, the first term satisfies
‖(R̂>K −R>K)(R̂K −RK)/n‖ ≤ ‖(R̂K −RK)/
√
n‖2 = OP (ζ21 (K)/n).
For the second term, by (A.3), we obtain∥∥∥R>K (R̂K −RK) /n∥∥∥2 = tr{(R̂>K −R>K)RKR>K (R̂K −RK) /n2}
≤ [c¯Ψ + oP (1)] · tr
{(
R̂>K −R>K
)(
R̂K −RK
)
/n
}
= [c¯Ψ + oP (1)] · ‖(R̂K −RK)/
√
n‖2 = OP (ζ21 (K)/n).
(iii) We first note that Ψ−1nK − Ψ−1K = Ψ−1K (ΨK −ΨnK) Ψ−1nK . Then, Assumption 4.5(i) and (A.3) imply
the desired result:
∥∥Ψ−1nK −Ψ−1K ∥∥2 = tr{Ψ−1K (ΨK −ΨnK) Ψ−2nK (ΨK −ΨnK) Ψ−1K }
≤ [cΨ + oP (1)]−2 · tr
{
(ΨK −ΨnK) Ψ−2K (ΨK −ΨnK)
}
= OP (1) · ‖ΨnK −ΨK‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (ζ
2
0 (K)(logK)/n)
.
(iv) The proof is the same as in (iii) by noting (A.6).
Lemma B.3. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3(i)–(iii), 4.4, 4.5(i), and 4.6–4.11 hold. Then, we have
(i) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣g˜(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n) +OP (K−s/2),
(ii) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
g˜
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)
)∣∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)K√(log n)/n) +OP (K(2−s)/2),
(iii) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣ĝ(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n) +OP (K−s/2),
(iv) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
ĝ
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)
)∣∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)K√(log n)/n) +OP (K(2−s)/2).
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Proof. (i) By the triangle inequality and Assumptions 4.7 and 4.9(i), we have
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣g˜(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)∣∣∣
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− bK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1 ∣∣∣
= sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )∣∣∣+O(K−s/2)
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣PnK [T (1,0)(p1, p2)u1(p1, p2)]∣∣∣+O(K−s/2)
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ ‖PnK‖∞,S(1,0) · sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣T (1,0)(p1, p2)u1(p1, p2)∣∣∣+O(K−s/2)
= sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+OP (K−s/2),
where u1(p1, p2) := g
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− bK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1 .
Following the proof of Lemma 3.1(ii) of Chen and Christensen (2018), we show that the first term on the
right-hand side is of order OP (ζ0(K)
√
(log n)/n). Firstly, we partition the interval [0, 1] into countably many
sub-intervals of equal length and let the set of the partitioning points (including 0 and 1) be Tn. We can construct
the partition such that for any (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2 there exists a point (tp1 , tp2) ∈ T 2n satisfying
‖(p1, p2)− (tp1 , tp2)‖ ≤ cpζ0(K)K−(ω+1/2),
for some positive constant cp > 0, where ω is as in Assumption 4.11(i). Then, by Assumption 4.11(i), we have
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣
≤ max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈[0,1]2
∣∣∣{bK(p1, p2)− bK(tp1 , tp2)}> SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣
≤ max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+O(ζ0(K)K−1/2) · ∥∥∥SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∥∥∥
= max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ OP (ζ0(K)/√n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (ζ0(K)
√
logn/n)
,
where the last equality follows from (A.5).
To examine the first term on the right-hand side, decompose e1i = e11i + e12i, where
e11i := e1i1{|e1i| ≤Mn} − E[e1i1{|e1i| ≤Mn}|Wi, Di],
e12i := e1i1{|e1i| > Mn} − E[e1i1{|e1i| > Mn}|Wi, Di],
and Mn is a sequence of positive numbers diverging to ∞. Let e11 = (e111, . . . , e11n)> and e12 =
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(e121, . . . , e12n)
>. Then, we observe
bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1nKR
>
Ke1/n
= bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke1/n+ bK(t1, t2)
>SK
(
Ψ−1nK −Ψ−1K
)
R>Ke1/n
= bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke11/n+ bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke12/n+ bK(t1, t2)
>SK
(
Ψ−1nK −Ψ−1K
)
R>Ke1/n
= bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke11/n+ bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke12/n+OP (ζ
2
0 (K)
√
(logK)/n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (ζ0(K)
√
(logn)/n)
,
where the last equality follows from Lemma B.2(iii) and Markov’s inequality.
Let qi(t1, t2) := bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1K RK(P
0
1i, P
1
2i), so that
1
n
n∑
i=1
qi(t1, t2)e11i = bK(t1, t2)
>SKΨ−1K R
>
Ke11/n.
Note that E[qi(t1, t2)e11i] = 0. Furthermore, it is straightforward by the Cauchy–Schwarz inequality that there
exist positive constants c1, c2 > 0 such that
|qi(t1, t2)| ≤ ‖bK(t1, t2)‖ ·
∥∥Ψ−1K RK(P 01i, P 12i)∥∥ ≤ c1ζ20 (K),
and that E[q2i (t1, t2)] ≤ c2ζ20 (K). Therefore, for all (t1, t2) ∈ T 2n , we have |qi(t1, t2)e11i| ≤ c′1ζ20 (K)Mn and
E[q2i (t1, t2)e
2
11i] = E
[
q2i (t1, t2)E[e
2
11i|Wi, Di]
] ≤ c′2ζ20 (K) for some c′1, c′2 > 0 by Assumption 4.6. From
Bernstein’s inequality for any non-negative %n ≥ 0, we have
Pr
(
max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1K R>Ke11/n∣∣∣ > %n) ≤ |T 2n | max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
qi(t1, t2)e11i
∣∣∣∣∣ > %n
)
≤ 2 exp
{
log |T 2n | −
1
4
%2n
c′2ζ20 (K)/n+ c′1ζ20 (K)Mn%n/n
}
≤ 2 exp
{
log |T 2n | −
%2n
c3(ζ20 (K)/n)[1 +Mn%n]
}
,
for some positive constant c3 > 0, where |T 2n | denotes the cardinality of the set T 2n . Then, setting %n =
Cζ0(K)
√
(log n)/n for a large constant C > 0, provided that |T 2n | and Mn grow sufficiently slowly so that
Mn%n = o(1), we have
log |T 2n | −
%2n
c3(ζ20 (K)/n)[1 +Mn%n]
= log |T 2n | −
C2ζ20 (K)(log n)/n
c3(ζ20 (K)/n)[1 + o(1)]
 log
( |T 2n |
nC2
)
→ −∞,
as C →∞, implying that max(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1K R>Ke11/n∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n).
Next, by Markov’s inequality and Assumption 4.6, it holds that
Pr
(
max
(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1K R>Ke12/n∣∣∣ > %n) ≤ Pr(ζ0(K) ∥∥∥Ψ−1K R>Ke12/n∥∥∥ > %n)
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≤ Pr
(
c4ζ
2
0 (K)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
e12i
∣∣∣∣∣ > %n
)
≤ 2c4ζ
2
0 (K)
%n
E[|e1i|1{|e1i| > Mn}]
≤ 2c4ζ
2
0 (K)
%nM3n
E[e41i1{|e1i| > Mn}] = O
(
ζ20 (K)
%nM3n
)
.
Again, setting %n = Cζ0(K)
√
(log n)/n for a large constant C > 0, if ζ0(K)/
√
(log n)/n = O(M3n),
ζ20 (K)
%nM3n
=
1
C
ζ0(K)√
(log n)/nM3n
→ 0,
as C →∞, which implies max(t1,t2)∈T 2n
∣∣bK(t1, t2)>SKΨ−1K R>Ke12/n∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n). It should
be noted that ζ0(K)/
√
(log n)/n = O(M3n) is not inconsistent with the requirementMnζ0(K)
√
(log n)/n =
o(1) under Assumption 4.11(ii). By combining these results, the proof is completed.
(ii) From the triangle inequality and Assumption 4.7, we have
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
g˜
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)
)∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
bK(p1, p2)
>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )
)∣∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
g
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− bK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1
)∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
bK(p1, p2)
>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )
)∣∣∣∣+O(K(2−s)/2).
Further, by Assumption 4.10, we have
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣∣ ∂2∂p1∂p2
(
bK(p1, p2)
>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )
)∣∣∣∣ = O(K) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>(α˜(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )∣∣∣
= OP (ζ0(K)K
√
(log n)/n) +OP (K
(2−s)/2),
where the second equality follows from (i). This completes the proof.
(iii) From the decomposition for δ̂(1,0)1n in (A.2), the triangle inequality and Assumptions 4.7 and 4.9(ii)
imply
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣ĝ(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)∣∣∣
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>(α̂(1,0)1n − α(1,0)1 )∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− bK(p1, p2)>α(1,0)1 ∣∣∣
≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣
+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>K (T− T̂) ĝ(1,0)1 /n∣∣∣
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+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣P̂nK [T̂ (1,0)(p1, p2)u1(p1, p2)]∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
OP (K−s/2)
+O(K−s/2).
From the triangle inequality,∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SK {Ψ̂−1nK −Ψ−1nK} R̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nK (R̂K −RK)>T(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣∣
+
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣ .
Similarly to (A.8), we can easily see that∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SK {Ψ̂−1nK −Ψ−1nK} R̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣ p OP (n−1/2) · ||bK(p1, p2)|| · ∥∥∥Ψ̂−1nK −Ψ−1nK∥∥∥
= OP (ζ0(K)ζ1(K)/n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (ζ0(K)
√
(logn)/n)
,
∣∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nK (R̂K −RK)>T(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣∣ p OP (n−1/2) · ||bK(p1, p2)|| · ∥∥∥(R̂K −RK) /√n∥∥∥
= OP (ζ0(K)ζ1(K)/n)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (ζ0(K)
√
(logn)/n)
,
uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0), where the equalities follow from (B.2).
Here, for arbitrary constants C1 and C2, let
g˘
(1,0)
1 (P
0
1 , P
1
2 ) := g
(1,0)
1 (P
0
1 , P
1
2 )− g(1,0)1 (P 01 + C1n−1/2, P 12 + C2n−1/2),
and g˘(1,0)1 := (g˘
(1,0)
1 (P
0
11, P
1
21), . . . , g˘
(1,0)
1 (P
0
1n, P
1
2n))
>. Then, we obtain
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣ p sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>KTg˘(1,0)1 /n∣∣∣
= sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣Pnk [T (1,0)(p1, p2)g˘(1,0)1 (p1, p2)]∣∣∣
≤ ‖Pnk‖∞,S(1,0) ·O(n−1/2) = OP (n−1/2),
under Assumption 4.9(i). Summarizing these results, we obtain
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>KT(g(1,0)1 − ĝ(1,0)1 ) /n∣∣∣ = OP (ζ0(K)ζ1(K)/n+ n−1/2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
oP (ζ0(K)
√
(logn)/n)
.
(B.3)
Applying the same argument as above, it can be verified that∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>K (T− T̂) ĝ(1,0)1 /n∣∣∣ = oP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n),
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and that ∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ̂−1nKR̂>Ke1/n∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣+ oP (ζ0(K)√(log n)/n),
uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0). Thus, we obtain
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣ĝ(1,0)1 (p1, p2)− g(1,0)1 (p1, p2)∣∣∣ ≤ sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>SKΨ−1nKR>Ke1/n∣∣∣
+ oP (ζ0(K)
√
(log n)/n) +OP (K
−s/2).
Finally, the result follows from the fact that the first term on the right-hand side is of orderOP (ζ0(K)
√
log n/n),
as shown in the proof of (i).
(iv) The proof of (iv) is analogous to that of (ii).
Lemma B.4. Suppose that Assumptions 4.1–4.4, 4.5(i) and 4.6–4.11 hold. Then, we have
(i) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣E˜n[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]− E[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]∣∣∣
= OP (ζ0(K)K
√
log n/n) +OP (K
(2−s)/2),
(ii) sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
∣∣∣Ên[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]− E[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]∣∣∣
= OP (ζ0(K)K
√
log n/n) +OP (K
(2−s)/2).
Proof. (i) The proof of (i) is immediate from Lemma B.3(ii).
(ii) Assumptions 4.3(i) and (iv) imply that ĥ(p1, p2) is uniformly consistent for h(p1, p2) and that ĥ(p1, p2)
is uniformly bounded away from zero w.p.a.1. Thus, uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0), we have∣∣∣∣∣ 1h(p1, p2) − 1ĥ(p1, p2)
∣∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣ ĥ(p1, p2)− h(p1, p2)h(p1, p2) · ĥ(p1, p2)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ OP (1) ·
∣∣∣ĥ(p1, p2)− h(p1, p2)∣∣∣ = OP (1) · |ρ̂n − ρ∗| = OP (n−1/2). (B.4)
From the triangle and Cauchy–Schwarz inequalities, (B.4), and Lemma B.3(iv), it holds that∣∣∣Ên[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]− E[U (1,0)1 |V1 = p1, V2 = p2]∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣∣ 1ĥ(p1, p2) ∂
2
∂p1∂p2
(
g
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)− ĝ(1,0)1 (p1, p2)
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
h(p1, p2)
− 1
ĥ(p1, p2)
)
∂2g
(1,0)
1 (p1, p2)
∂p1∂p2
∣∣∣∣∣
= OP (ζ0(K)K
√
log n/n) +OP (K
(2−s)/2) +OP (n−1/2),
uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0).
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C Appendix: Verification of the Assumptions for the Asymptotic Results
Verification of ζ1(K) = O(K) for tensor-product B-splines. We consider univariate B-splines of order
r with quasi-uniform k internal knots, i.e., br(p) := (br,1(p), . . . br,k+r(p))> for p ∈ [0, 1], where the length
of each knot interval is proportional to 1/k. In the notation of the main text, bK(p1, p2) = br(p1) ⊗ br(p2)
such that k2  K. As is well known, the derivatives of B-spline functions can be simply expressed in terms
of lower-order B-spline functions. Specifically, the first derivative of br(p) can be written as (e.g., Zhou and
Wolfe, 2000)
∂br(p)
∂p
= (r − 1)∆rbr−1(p),
where we denote knots as . . . , t0, t1, t2, . . . and
∆r :=

−1
t1−t2−r 0 0 · · · 0 0
1
t1−t2−r
−1
t2−t3−r 0 · · · 0 0
0 1t2−t3−r
−1
t3−t4−r · · · 0 0
...
...
... . . .
...
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 1tk+r−1−tk

︸ ︷︷ ︸
(k+r)×(k+r−1)
.
Then, since χmax(∆>r ∆r) = O(k2), we have∥∥∥∥∂br(p)∂p
∥∥∥∥2 = (r − 1)2 · b>r−1(p)∆>r ∆rbr−1(p)
≤ O(k2) ‖br−1(p)‖2︸ ︷︷ ︸
O(k)
= O(k3).
uniformly in p. Hence,∥∥∥∥∂bK(p1, p2)∂p1
∥∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥∥∂br(p1)∂p1 ⊗ br(p2)
∥∥∥∥2 = ∥∥∥∥∂br(p1)∂p1
∥∥∥∥2 · ‖br(p2)‖2
≤ O(k4) = O(K2),
uniformly in (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]2. This implies the desired result.
Verification of Assumption 4.9(ii). Below is a sketch of how we can verify 4.9(ii) for basis functions with an
equally spaced local polynomial structure, such as B-splines and the partitioning polynomial series in Cattaneo
and Farrell (2013). Let ĝ := (g(P̂ 011, P̂ 121), . . . , g(P̂ 01n, P̂ 12n))> for g ∈ L∞(S(1,0)). Assuming that (A.6) holds,
we can observe that∣∣∣P̂nK [g(p1, p2)]∣∣∣2 = n−2 · tr{Ψ̂−1nKR̂>K ĝĝ>R̂KΨ̂−1nKS>KbK(p1, p2)bK(p1, p2)>SK}
≤ OP (n−2) · tr
{
R̂>K ĝĝ
>R̂KΨ̂−1nKS
>
KbK(p1, p2)bK(p1, p2)
>SK
}
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≤ OP (n−2) · tr
{
S>KbK(p1, p2)bK(p1, p2)>SKR̂>K ĝĝ>R̂K
}
≤ OP (1) ·
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
bK(p1, p2)
>SKRK(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)g(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
We additionally assume that (P 01 , P 12 ) is quasi-uniformly distributed on S(1,0). Then, for any (p1, p2) ∈ S(1,0),
there exists a closed rectangle R(p1, p2) containing (p1, p2) in its interior that may depend on n and K,
such that bK(p1, p2)>bK(P 01 , P 12 ) = 0 if (P 01 , P 12 ) 6∈ R(p1, p2) and Pr((P 01 , P 12 ) ∈ R(p1, p2)) = O(1/K).
Letting 1̂i(p1, p2) = 1((P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i) ∈ R(p1, p2)), in view of Lemma B.1, we would obtain 1n
∑n
i=1 1̂i(p1, p2) =
OP (1/K). Then, the above inequality yields
∣∣∣P̂nK [g(p1, p2)]∣∣∣ = OP (1) ·
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
bK(p1, p2)
>SKRK(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)g(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ OP (1) · 1
n
n∑
i=1
1̂i(p1, p2)
∣∣∣bK(p1, p2)>bK(P̂ 01i, P̂ 12i)∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
ζ20 (K)=O(K)
sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
|g(p1, p2)|
p sup
(p1,p2)∈S(1,0)
|g(p1, p2)|.
Then, ‖P̂nK‖∞,S(1,0) = OP (1) follows from the definition of the sup-operator norm used here.
D Appendix: Identification of the Treatment Decision Game
We examine the global identification of the parameter in the treatment decision game introduced in Section 4.
Bjorn andVuong (1984) establish the identification of a similar gamemodel by examining the Fisher information
matrix. Our analysis below extends their result with a different proof strategy that allows for a general copula
representation of the joint CDF of the unobservables and heterogeneity of the interaction effect.
As shown in (4.1), we have the following system of equations for the probabilities L(d1,d2)(w) := Pr(D =
(d1, d2)|W = w) for the given w = (w1, w2), which are identifiable from the observed data:
L(1,0)(w) = p01 −H(p01, p12; ρ)
L(0,1)(w) = p02 −H(p11, p02; ρ)
L(1,1)(w) = H(p11, p12; ρ)− λ · Lmul(p; ρ)
where p0j = Fεj (w>j γ0), p1j = Fεj (w>j γ0 + η(w>j γ1)), p = (p01, p11, p02, p12), and Lmul(p; ρ) = H(p11, p12; ρ) −
H(p11, p
0
2; ρ) −H(p01, p12; ρ) + H(p01, p02; ρ) for a given parameter value θ = (γ>, ρ, λ)>. Note that L(0,0)(w)
is redundant, as it is a linear combination of the above probabilities: L(0,0)(w) = 1−L(1,0)(w)−L(0,1)(w)−
L(1,1)(w).
In addition to Assumptions 2.1, 3.2, and 4.1, we introduce the following assumptions. Below, we consider
a general parameter value θ = (γ>, ρ, λ)> (treating the true value θ∗ = (γ∗>, ρ∗, λ∗)> as a special case) that
belongs to a parameter space Θ ⊆ R2dim(W ) × (cρ, c¯ρ)× (0, 1).
Assumption D.1.
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(i) The interaction function η(·) is strictly increasing, positive, and continuous.
(ii) The marginal CDFs of (ε1, ε2), Fε1(·), and Fε2(·) are strictly increasing and continuous.
(iii) The copula H(·, ·; ρ) is twice differentiable in its arguments and ρ ∈ [cρ, c¯ρ].
Assumption D.2.
(i) There exist pairs of values w = (w1, w2) and w˜ = (w˜1, w˜2) such that w˜>1 γ0 = 0, H(p01, p12; ρ) =
H(p˜01, p˜
1
2; ρ), and p01 6= p˜01, where p˜0j = Fεj (w˜>j γ0) and p˜1j = Fεj (w˜>j γ0 + η(w˜>j γ1)). The set of the
values ofW1 satisfying these conditions, that is,⋃
w2∈supp[W2]
{
w1 ∈ supp[W1|W2 = w2] : ∃w˜ ∈ supp[W ], w˜>1 γ0 = 0, H(p01, p12; ρ) = H(p˜01, p˜12; ρ), p01 6= p˜01
}
,
is non-empty and does not lie in a proper linear subspace of Rdim(W ) a.s.
(ii) The set of the values ofW1⋃
w2,w¨2∈supp[W2]
{
w1 ∈ supp[W1|W2 = w2] ∩ supp[W1|W2 = w¨2] : w>2 γ0 6= w¨>2 γ0
}
,
is non-empty and does not lie in a proper linear subspace of Rdim(W ) a.s.
Assumption D.1 is a set of regularity conditions that partly overlap with Assumption 4.3.
Assumption D.2(i) requires that the support of W is sufficiently rich to vary the values of w>1 γ0 and
H(p01, p
1
2; ρ). This implicitly requires that γ0 and γ1 are non-zero vectors and that W1 and W2 contain some
player-specific elements. In practice, we need not detect the exact values of w and w˜ satisfying the condition.
Further, this assumption may be regarded as a replacement for the condition for using the identification-at-
infinity strategy. The identification-at-infinity requires that (at least) one variable inW2 can tend to −∞ or∞,
which can reduce the model to a single-agent decision problem and allow us to identify γ easily. Instead of
using the identification-at-infinity approach, as in condition (i), we focus on a situation where H(p01, p12; ρ) in
L(1,0)(w) and H(p˜01, p˜12; ρ) in L(1,0)(w˜) balance out.
Assumption D.3. The copula functionH(p1, p2; ρ) is strictly more stochastically increasing in the joint distri-
bution with respect to ρ (see Definition 3.3 of Han and Vytlacil (2017)).
This assumption restricts a dependence ordering of the copula function in terms of stochastic monotonicity.
In Han and Vytlacil (2017), this property was introduced to identify generalized bivariate probit models, and it
was shown that several commonly used copula functions satisfy it (e.g., the Gaussian copula and FGM copula).
The reader is referred to that study for further discussions on the dependence ordering properties of copula
functions.
Theorem D.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 3.2, 4.1, D.1, D.2, and D.3 hold for a given parameter value
θ = (γ>, ρ, λ)> ∈ Θ. Further, we assume that {(w>1 γ0 + η(w>1 γ1), ρ) : θ ∈ Θ} is open and simply connected
for any given w1. Then, θ is globally identified if γ0 and γ1 are non-zero vectors and Lmul(p; ρ) > 0 for some
p ∈ supp[P].
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Proof. To show the identifiability of γ0, we examine the following system for w and w˜ given in Assumption
D.2(i): {
L(1,0)(w) = p01 −H(p01, p12; ρ)
L(1,0)(w˜) = p˜01 −H(p˜01, p˜12; ρ)
,
so that L(1,0)(w) − L(1,0)(w˜) = p01 − p˜01 under the condition H(p01, p12; ρ) = H(p˜01, p˜12; ρ). Since w˜>1 γ0 = 0
by assumption, p˜01 = Fε1(0) does not depend on γ0. Hence, the strict monotonicity of Fε1 implies that
w>1 γ0 = F−1ε1 (L(1,0)(w)− L(1,0)(w˜) + Fε1(0)). This equation identifies w>1 γ0, implying the identifiability of
γ0 under Assumption D.2(i).
We now show the identification of (γ1, ρ). We consider any pair of values (w1, w2) and (w1, w¨2) such that
p02 6= p¨02, where p¨02 = Fε2(w¨>2 γ0). Such w and w¨ exist by Assumption D.2(ii) and the strict monotonicity of
Fε2 . We now have the following system:{
L(0,1)(w1, w2) = p02 −H(p11, p02; ρ)
L(0,1)(w1, w¨2) = p¨02 −H(p11, p¨02; ρ)
.
Here, the parameter to be identified is (p11, ρ), as p02 and p¨02 are already identified by the identification of γ0. If
this system has a unique solution, we achieve the identification of (p11, ρ). To proceed, we define the following
function:
G(ϑw1) :=
(
p02 −H(p11, p02; ρ)
p¨02 −H(p11, p¨02; ρ)
)
,
where ϑw1 := (p11, ρ). The Jacobian of G(ϑw1) is given by
JG(ϑw1) :=
∂G(ϑw1)
∂ϑ>w1
=
(
−H1(p11, p02; ρ) −Hρ(p11, p02; ρ)
−H1(p11, p¨02; ρ) −Hρ(p11, p¨02; ρ)
)
,
whereH1 andHρ are the partial derivatives of the copulaH with respect to the first argument and ρ, respectively.
Its determinant is given by
|JG(ϑw1)| = H1(p11, p02; ρ)H1(p11, p¨02; ρ)
(
Hρ(p
1
1, p¨
0
2; ρ)
H1(p11, p¨
0
2; ρ)
− Hρ(p
1
1, p
0
2; ρ)
H1(p11, p
0
2; ρ)
)
,
which is positive for any p02 > p¨02 and is negative for any p02 < p¨02 under Assumptions D.1(iii) and D.3 (see
Lemma 4.1 of Han and Vytlacil, 2017). This implies that JG(ϑw1) is of full rank when p02 6= p¨02. Hence, the
same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 5.1 in Han and Vytlacil (2017) lead to the identification of ϑw1
under the assumption that {(w>1 γ0 + η(w>1 γ1), ρ) : θ ∈ Θ} is open and simply connected. Moreover, the strict
monotonicity of Fεj and η implies that w>1 γ1 = η−1(F−1ε1 (p
1
1) − w>1 γ0) and thus that γ1 is identified from p11
and γ0 under Assumption D.2(ii).
Finally, λ can be identified by λ = (H(p11, p12; ρ) − L(1,1)(w))/Lmul(p; ρ) under the assumption that
Lmul(p; ρ) > 0 for p ∈ supp[P].
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E Appendix: Identification of Several Treatment Parameters
We examine the identification of several treatment parameters based on the results in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2.
Individual-specific treatment effects. It may be of interest to estimate the treatment effects when only player
1’s treatment status switches, whereas that of player 2 is unspecified and subject to change endogenously. The
parameter of interest in this situation would be
τindiv(x, p1, p2) := E[Y
(1,D2)
1 − Y (0,D2)1 |X = x, V1 = p1, V2 = p2],
where Y (d1,D2)1 := (1−D2)Y (d1,0)1 +D2Y (d1,1)1 . We call this MTE parameter the individual MTE.9 Let
m(d1,D2)(x, v1, v2) := E[Y
(d1,D2)
1 |X = x, V1 = v1, V2 = v2].
After some calculations, we can show that
m(0,D2)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) = m
(0,0)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) for (d1, d2) 6= (1, 0),
m(0,D2)(x, p11, p
0
2) =
1
λ
(
m(0,1)(x, p11, p
0
2)− (1− λ) ·m(0,0)(x, p11, p02)
)
for λ > 0,
m(1,D2)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) = m
(1,1)(x, pd11 , p
d2
2 ) for (d1, d2) 6= (0, 1),
m(1,D2)(x, p01, p
1
2) =
1
(1− λ)
(
m(1,0)(x, p01, p
1
2)− λ ·m(1,1)(x, p01, p12)
)
for λ < 1,
under Assumptions 2.1, 3.1, and 3.2. This implies that the individual MTE can be identified as follows:
τindiv(x, p
0
1, p
0
2) = τtotal(x, p
0
1, p
0
2),
τindiv(x, p
0
1, p
1
2) =
1
1− λτ
(0)
direct(x, p
0
1, p
1
2)−
λ
1− λτtotal(x, p
0
1, p
1
2),
for example. Thus, for the estimation of the individual MTE, it is sufficient to calculate the direct MTE and
total MTE, so that no additional estimation is required.
LATE. It is also possible to identify the LATE: the average causal effect for agents whose treatment status is
strictly altered by the instrumental variables (e.g., Imbens and Angrist, 1994). To define the LATE parameters
in our context, we consider z and z′ for the instrument. Suppose that the values of P are p = (p01, p11, p02, p12)
whenZ = z, and p′ = (p0′1 , p1
′
1 , p
0′
2 , p
1′
2 ) whenZ = z′. For illustrative purposes, we assume that p > p′ (where
the inequality is element-wise), as depicted in Figure 5. Although we can consider several LATE parameters,
as examples, we here focus on the direct LATE:
E[Y
(1,0)
1 − Y (0,0)1 |X = x, p0
′
1 < V1 ≤ p01, p12 < V2 ≤ 1],
9 This is somewhat similar to the framework in Frölich and Huber (2017), where the identification of causal models that allow the
presence of an endogenous “mediator” variable was investigated. In our model,D2 may be regarded as the mediator ofD1.
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and the total LATE
E[Y
(1,1)
1 − Y (0,0)1 |X = x, p1
′
1 < V1 ≤ p11, p1
′
2 < V2 ≤ p12].
The former and latter indicate the average causal effects for the players in regions [A] and [B], respectively. The
pairs of players in region [A] change their treatment status from D = (1, 0) to (0, 0) as the value of Z shifts
from z to z′. Similarly, the pairs of players in region [B] select D = (0, 0) when Z = z′, but D = (1, 1) or
(0, 0) when Z = z. As in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), we can write the LATE parameters as the weighted
averages of the MTE parameters:
Direct LATE =
∫ 1
p12
∫ p01
p0
′
1
τ
(0)
direct(x, v1, v2)
h(v1, v2|x)
Pr[p0
′
1 < V1 ≤ p01, p12 < V2 ≤ 1|X = x]
dv1dv2,
Total LATE =
∫ p12
p1
′
2
∫ p11
p1
′
1
τtotal(x, v1, v2)
h(v1, v2|x)
Pr[p1
′
1 < V1 ≤ p11, p1′2 < V2 ≤ p12|X = x]
dv1dv2.
Because the MTE parameters and weight functions in the integrals are identified, the LATE parameters are also
identified.
Figure 5: LATEs.
PRTE. The PRTE is the difference in the average outcomes when switching from the baseline policy to a
counterfactual policy that induces a change in the distribution of IV (Heckman and Vytlacil, 2005). To proceed,
we write I(d1,d2) = I(d1,d2)(P, V, ;λ) with a known function I(d1,d2)(·, ·, ·; ·) to clarify the dependence of the
treatment decisions on P, V , , and λ. For example, I(0,0) = I(0,0)(P, V, ;λ) = 1(V ∈ V(0,0)uni (P)) + 1(V ∈
Vmul(P),  ≤ λ) under Assumption 3.2. We consider a counterfactual policy that does alter P and/or λ but
does not affect Y (d1,d2)1 ,X , V , and . LetP? be a counterfactual variable ofP with a known distribution (given
X = x) and λ? be a known counterfactual value of λ. We denote the treatment decisions under (P?, λ?) asD? =
49
(D?1, D
?
2). The outcome for player 1 under the counterfactual policy is Y ?1 =
∑1
d1=0
∑1
d2=0
I?(d1,d2)Y
(d1,d2)
1 ,
where I?(d1,d2) := 1(D? = (d1, d2)) = I(d1,d2)(P?, V, ;λ?). The PRTE (given X = x) is defined as
E[Y ?1 |X = x]− E[Y1|X = x]. The law of iterated expectations leads to
E[Y ?1 |X = x] =
1∑
d1=0
1∑
d2=0
E
[
E
[
I?(d1,d2)Y
(d1,d2)
1
∣∣∣X = x,P?]∣∣∣X = x] .
Under the assumptions stated above, we can observe that
E
[
I?(d1,d2)Y
(d1,d2)
1
∣∣∣X = x,P? = p?] = E [I(d1,d2)(p?, V, ;λ?)Y (d1,d2)1 ∣∣∣X = x]
= E
[
I(d1,d2)(p?, V, ;λ?)E
[
Y
(d1,d2)
1
∣∣∣X = x, V, ]∣∣∣X = x]
=
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
I(d1,d2)(p?, v, e;λ?)m(d1,d2)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2de.
Hence, it can hold that
E[Y ?1 |X = x] =
1∑
d1=0
1∑
d2=0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
E
[
I(d1,d2)(P?, v, e;λ?)
∣∣∣X = x]m(d1,d2)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2de.
In the same manner, we can observe the following result for the baseline policy:
E[Y1|X = x] =
1∑
d1=0
1∑
d2=0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
E
[
I(d1,d2)(P, v, e;λ)
∣∣∣X = x]m(d1,d2)(x, v1, v2)h(v1, v2|x)dv1dv2de.
Therefore, given the identification of the MTR functions m(d1,d2)(x, v1, v2) for any (d1, d2) ∈ {0, 1}2 and
(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]2, the PRTE E[Y ?1 |X = x]− E[Y1|X = x] can be identified based on these equations.
F Appendix: Monte Carlo Simulation
This section presents the Monte Carlo simulation analysis to investigate the finite sample performance of our
estimators. The treatment variable is generated by
Dj = 1(γ01 + γ02Z0j +D−j · exp(γ11 + γ12Z1j) ≥ εj),
where Z0j ∼ Uniform(−1, 1), Z1j ∼ Uniform(−2, 2), and εj ∼ N(0, 1). The true values of the parameters
are γ∗0 = (γ∗01, γ∗02) = (−0.5, 1.5) and γ∗1 = (γ∗11, γ∗12) = (−0.3, 0.6). The joint distribution of (Vj , V−j) is
defined by the FGM copula with the dependence parameter of ρ∗ = 0.7. As in Assumption 3.2, D = (0, 0)
occurs in the region of multiple equilibria if and only if  ≤ λ∗ with  ∼ Uniform[0, 1] and λ∗ = 0.5.
The potential outcomes are generated by
Y
(dj ,d−j)
j = β
(dj ,d−j)
0 +Xjβ
(dj ,d−j)
1 + U
(dj ,d−j)
j ,
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whereXj ∼ N(0, 1) and U (dj ,d−j)j = σ(dj ,d−j) · (µ(V1, V2) + ςj) with ςj ∼ N(0, 1). We consider two designs
for the function µ(·, ·); specifically, µ(V1, V2) = V1 − V2 and µ(V1, V2) = sin(2 ·Φ−1(V1)) · cos(2 ·Φ−1(V2))
in designs 1 and 2, respectively. Design 1 is the case of a linear MTE and design 2 exhibits a highly nonlinear
MTE. The true values of β(dj ,d−j) = (β(dj ,d−j)0 , β
(dj ,d−j)
1 ) and σ(dj ,d−j) are set to β(1,0) = β(0,1) = (2, 1),
β(1,1) = β(0,0) = (1, 2), σ(1,0) = σ(0,1) = 0.8, and σ(1,1) = σ(0,0) = 0.6.
We evaluate both the feasible and the infeasible estimators for the directMTE τ (0)direct(x, p1, p2) = m
(1,0)
1 (x, p1, p2)−
m
(0,0)
1 (x, p1, p2); the feasible estimator is based on the first-stage ML estimates of θ∗, while the infeasible one
treats θ∗ as known. We fix x = 0.5 and p1 = 0.4 and consider nine values of p2 ∈ {0.1, 0.2, . . . , 0.9}, which
results in nine MTE values as the parameters of interest, which are labeled “MTE1,” “MTE2,” and so on.
We estimate the MTR functions for D = (1, 0) and D = (0, 0) based on the semiparametric partially linear
regression models with/without a small regularization parameter. For a regularized regression, we employ a
ridge regression with the regularization parameter equal to 10 ·n−1. For the choice of basis function, we employ
a bivariate power series and tensor-product B-splines. The order of the bivariate power series is bn1/6c, where
b·c is the floor function. The order of the univariate B-splines is set to 3 and the number of inner knots is
bn1/12c.10 To estimate the MTR function forD = (0, 0), we employ the over-identified estimator introduced in
Remark 4.2. We consider three sample sizes n ∈ {1000, 3000, 9000} for each setup and the following results
are based 1,000 Monte Carlo replications.
Tables 3 and 4 present the bias and RMSE for the direct MTE estimation based on the bivariate power series
and tensor-product B-splines, respectively. Notably, the performances of the feasible and infeasible estimators
are almost identical, which is consistent with our theory. Further, the estimator based on the bivariate power
series outperforms that based on the tensor-product B-splines. The precision for the bivariate power series
is satisfactory even with the sample size of 1,000, while the estimator with tensor-product B-splines is not
reliable for small samples. However, the accuracy of the B-splines-based estimator can be improved rapidly as
the sample size increases. In addition, using the ridge regression can further improve the performance of the
estimators, particularly when the B-splines-based estimator is used and the sample size is not large.
The performances of the estimators deteriorate when the value of p2 is near the boundary (i.e., when p2 = 0.1
or p2 = 0.9). Recall that the identification of the MTEs relies on that (p1, p2) belongs to the intersection of
the conditional supports for P = (P 01 , P 11 , P 02 , P 12 ), as mentioned in Section 3. Since the realizations around
(p1, p2) in the intersection are often sparse when (p1, p2) is close to the boundary, the above observation is
reasonable.
Table 5 presents the results of the ML estimation for the first-stage treatment decision model. Both the bias
and the RMSE are satisfactorily small—even for a small sample size. This also demonstrates the validity of the
global identification result established in Appendix D.
To summarize, the simulation results are those corroborating our theoretical findings. In practice, when the
sample size is small, we recommend using a bivariate power series for the basis function with ridge regression
with a small regularization. The estimator based on tensor-product B-splines could be applicable for larger
sample sizes.
10 We also checked the simulation results based on other choices forK and the regularization parameter of other orders, although we
omit the results to save space. As expected, there are bias-variance trade-offs depending on the magnitudes ofK and the regularization.
In our situation, it seems thatK  n1/6 orK  n1/7 works better.
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Table 3: Simulation results for the direct MTE estimation (bivariate power series)
design n order ridge MTE1 MTE2 MTE3 MTE4 MTE5 MTE6 MTE7 MTE8 MTE9
Bias for feasible estimation
1 1000 3 no 0.020 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.036 0.051 0.063 0.070 0.072
1 1000 3 yes 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.040 0.036 0.029
1 3000 3 no 0.130 0.104 0.076 0.047 0.015 −0.020 −0.059 −0.103 −0.153
1 3000 3 yes 0.132 0.106 0.078 0.048 0.017 −0.018 −0.057 −0.102 −0.153
1 9000 4 no −0.020 −0.011 0.001 0.008 0.014 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.023
1 9000 4 yes −0.013 −0.006 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.020 0.016 0.021
2 1000 3 no −0.043 0.015 0.058 0.075 0.071 0.050 0.002 −0.073 −0.162
2 1000 3 yes −0.045 0.012 0.054 0.072 0.068 0.042 −0.010 −0.088 −0.180
2 3000 3 no 0.013 0.055 0.085 0.090 0.070 0.025 −0.045 −0.141 −0.253
2 3000 3 yes 0.013 0.055 0.085 0.090 0.070 0.026 −0.043 −0.140 −0.252
2 9000 4 no 0.093 0.039 0.002 −0.029 −0.047 −0.046 −0.031 −0.007 0.069
2 9000 4 yes 0.099 0.043 0.005 −0.028 −0.048 −0.047 −0.034 −0.010 0.066
Bias for infeasible estimation
1 1000 3 no 0.035 0.035 0.032 0.028 0.035 0.052 0.064 0.067 0.066
1 1000 3 yes 0.050 0.046 0.040 0.033 0.033 0.037 0.039 0.035 0.028
1 3000 3 no 0.137 0.109 0.080 0.051 0.018 −0.018 −0.058 −0.102 −0.151
1 3000 3 yes 0.138 0.111 0.082 0.052 0.019 −0.017 −0.056 −0.101 −0.151
1 9000 4 no −0.018 −0.009 0.002 0.009 0.014 0.020 0.021 0.016 0.020
1 9000 4 yes −0.013 −0.006 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.018 0.018 0.014 0.019
2 1000 3 no −0.015 0.035 0.074 0.088 0.081 0.057 0.004 −0.075 −0.169
2 1000 3 yes −0.021 0.030 0.068 0.081 0.074 0.045 −0.010 −0.091 −0.186
2 3000 3 no 0.027 0.066 0.093 0.096 0.072 0.024 −0.048 −0.146 −0.260
2 3000 3 yes 0.027 0.066 0.093 0.096 0.073 0.025 −0.047 −0.145 −0.258
2 9000 4 no 0.106 0.048 0.008 −0.027 −0.049 −0.049 −0.038 −0.016 0.060
2 9000 4 yes 0.107 0.047 0.007 −0.028 −0.049 −0.049 −0.038 −0.017 0.059
RMSE for feasible estimation
1 1000 3 no 1.143 0.916 0.719 0.616 0.676 0.850 1.127 1.473 1.866
1 1000 3 yes 1.006 0.804 0.626 0.513 0.539 0.708 0.972 1.292 1.652
1 3000 3 no 0.555 0.456 0.361 0.286 0.267 0.319 0.422 0.560 0.722
1 3000 3 yes 0.551 0.452 0.358 0.283 0.261 0.312 0.416 0.555 0.716
1 9000 4 no 0.648 0.435 0.319 0.290 0.303 0.315 0.359 0.483 0.763
1 9000 4 yes 0.637 0.426 0.312 0.286 0.298 0.307 0.350 0.474 0.751
2 1000 3 no 1.253 1.007 0.798 0.690 0.744 0.928 1.225 1.600 2.030
2 1000 3 yes 1.096 0.879 0.691 0.573 0.596 0.773 1.058 1.407 1.801
2 3000 3 no 0.570 0.472 0.385 0.318 0.300 0.350 0.458 0.612 0.799
2 3000 3 yes 0.564 0.468 0.381 0.314 0.293 0.342 0.451 0.605 0.792
2 9000 4 no 0.720 0.474 0.345 0.318 0.338 0.350 0.394 0.525 0.835
2 9000 4 yes 0.707 0.463 0.336 0.313 0.331 0.344 0.386 0.517 0.823
RMSE for infeasible estimation
1 1000 3 no 1.139 0.914 0.711 0.594 0.647 0.813 1.084 1.421 1.799
1 1000 3 yes 1.008 0.806 0.624 0.502 0.521 0.687 0.947 1.260 1.608
1 3000 3 no 0.558 0.459 0.365 0.291 0.270 0.316 0.416 0.551 0.708
1 3000 3 yes 0.554 0.456 0.362 0.287 0.264 0.309 0.410 0.545 0.703
1 9000 4 no 0.655 0.440 0.323 0.292 0.304 0.314 0.358 0.484 0.766
1 9000 4 yes 0.642 0.430 0.314 0.286 0.298 0.307 0.350 0.474 0.753
2 1000 3 no 1.246 1.002 0.785 0.665 0.717 0.886 1.174 1.542 1.959
2 1000 3 yes 1.096 0.881 0.689 0.564 0.579 0.751 1.028 1.368 1.750
2 3000 3 no 0.570 0.475 0.389 0.323 0.303 0.346 0.451 0.602 0.787
2 3000 3 yes 0.564 0.470 0.385 0.319 0.297 0.339 0.444 0.596 0.781
2 9000 4 no 0.727 0.478 0.347 0.320 0.338 0.349 0.391 0.526 0.837
2 9000 4 yes 0.710 0.466 0.337 0.314 0.332 0.342 0.383 0.516 0.823
Note: The column labeled “order” indicates the order of the bivariate power series. The column labeled “ridge” indicates whether the
ridge regression is used.
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Table 4: Simulation results for the direct MTE estimation (tensor-product B-splines)
design n #knots ridge MTE1 MTE2 MTE3 MTE4 MTE5 MTE6 MTE7 MTE8 MTE9
Bias for feasible estimation
1 1000 1 no 0.091 0.190 0.115 0.041 −0.074 −0.154 −0.183 −0.090 −0.158
1 1000 1 yes 0.132 0.217 0.145 0.068 −0.037 −0.109 −0.122 −0.022 −0.063
1 3000 1 no 0.064 −0.023 −0.059 −0.049 −0.013 0.009 0.003 0.028 0.094
1 3000 1 yes 0.066 −0.021 −0.057 −0.048 −0.013 0.009 0.004 0.030 0.097
1 9000 2 no −0.071 −0.053 −0.042 −0.040 −0.009 0.029 0.060 0.073 0.053
1 9000 2 yes −0.070 −0.053 −0.042 −0.040 −0.009 0.028 0.060 0.073 0.051
2 1000 1 no −0.038 0.170 0.132 0.002 −0.201 −0.317 −0.264 −0.094 −0.014
2 1000 1 yes −0.016 0.182 0.161 0.033 −0.148 −0.265 −0.232 −0.103 −0.050
2 3000 1 no −0.199 −0.105 −0.047 −0.077 −0.120 −0.214 −0.072 0.066 0.253
2 3000 1 yes −0.197 −0.104 −0.045 −0.076 −0.120 −0.214 −0.071 0.067 0.255
2 9000 2 no −0.103 −0.035 −0.042 −0.089 −0.016 0.056 0.101 0.110 −0.011
2 9000 2 yes −0.102 −0.034 −0.041 −0.089 −0.016 0.056 0.101 0.111 −0.013
Bias for infeasible estimation
1 1000 1 no −0.122 0.048 0.088 0.059 −0.002 0.075 −0.061 −0.216 −0.410
1 1000 1 yes −0.056 0.082 0.109 0.071 −0.005 0.053 0.030 0.007 −0.040
1 3000 1 no 0.037 −0.023 −0.035 −0.028 0.013 0.031 −0.011 −0.002 0.048
1 3000 1 yes 0.040 −0.022 −0.033 −0.027 0.013 0.030 −0.011 −0.001 0.051
1 9000 2 no −0.072 −0.045 −0.037 −0.035 −0.001 0.035 0.059 0.067 0.029
1 9000 2 yes −0.071 −0.044 −0.036 −0.036 −0.001 0.035 0.059 0.067 0.027
2 1000 1 no −0.185 0.115 0.152 0.030 −0.135 −0.166 −0.227 −0.273 −0.367
2 1000 1 yes −0.136 0.125 0.161 0.035 −0.130 −0.172 −0.089 0.021 0.098
2 3000 1 no −0.215 −0.090 −0.015 −0.049 −0.082 −0.184 −0.090 0.032 0.209
2 3000 1 yes −0.213 −0.088 −0.014 −0.048 −0.082 −0.185 −0.089 0.034 0.212
2 9000 2 no −0.105 −0.020 −0.030 −0.078 −0.007 0.060 0.096 0.096 −0.033
2 9000 2 yes −0.104 −0.020 −0.030 −0.078 −0.007 0.060 0.096 0.097 −0.035
RMSE for feasible estimation
1 1000 1 no 6.858 4.320 3.601 2.406 2.917 3.915 5.593 10.262 16.442
1 1000 1 yes 6.687 4.139 3.447 2.301 2.730 3.646 4.194 7.323 12.051
1 3000 1 no 2.860 1.733 1.549 1.026 0.948 1.438 1.367 1.798 3.130
1 3000 1 yes 2.856 1.730 1.546 1.024 0.947 1.434 1.363 1.792 3.120
1 9000 2 no 2.100 1.526 0.723 0.923 0.992 0.534 0.831 1.376 1.789
1 9000 2 yes 2.099 1.526 0.723 0.923 0.992 0.534 0.831 1.376 1.782
2 1000 1 no 7.386 4.626 3.799 2.586 3.159 4.322 6.403 11.866 18.940
2 1000 1 yes 7.176 4.434 3.644 2.481 2.938 3.928 4.541 7.966 13.108
2 3000 1 no 3.105 1.884 1.653 1.114 1.060 1.573 1.476 1.979 3.445
2 3000 1 yes 3.099 1.881 1.649 1.113 1.059 1.570 1.472 1.972 3.433
2 9000 2 no 2.219 1.574 0.766 0.997 1.050 0.557 0.917 1.519 1.988
2 9000 2 yes 2.218 1.573 0.765 0.997 1.049 0.556 0.917 1.518 1.975
RMSE for infeasible estimation
1 1000 1 no 6.843 4.525 3.466 2.336 2.989 4.012 4.771 9.275 15.074
1 1000 1 yes 6.639 4.300 3.340 2.262 2.789 3.757 3.909 7.188 11.815
1 3000 1 no 2.816 1.691 1.499 1.002 0.945 1.414 1.312 1.756 3.129
1 3000 1 yes 2.812 1.688 1.496 1.000 0.944 1.411 1.308 1.749 3.118
1 9000 2 no 2.107 1.526 0.717 0.916 0.986 0.527 0.834 1.409 1.768
1 9000 2 yes 2.107 1.526 0.717 0.915 0.986 0.527 0.834 1.408 1.761
2 1000 1 no 7.500 4.880 3.763 2.520 3.143 4.333 5.134 9.940 16.162
2 1000 1 yes 7.280 4.631 3.620 2.439 2.964 4.038 4.106 7.602 12.591
2 3000 1 no 3.045 1.845 1.591 1.073 1.037 1.543 1.416 1.934 3.447
2 3000 1 yes 3.040 1.842 1.587 1.072 1.036 1.540 1.412 1.927 3.434
2 9000 2 no 2.222 1.574 0.761 0.997 1.043 0.548 0.914 1.545 1.957
2 9000 2 yes 2.221 1.574 0.761 0.996 1.042 0.548 0.914 1.545 1.944
Note: The column labeled “#knots” indicates the number of inner knots of the univariate B-splines. The column labeled “ridge”
indicates whether the ridge regression is used.
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Table 5: Simulation results for the ML estimation of the treatment decision game
n γ01 γ02 γ11 γ12 ρ λ
Bias
1000 −0.001 0.001 −0.017 0.014 −0.008 0.001
3000 0.004 −0.001 −0.017 0.010 0.021 0.003
9000 0.002 −0.001 −0.010 0.005 0.012 −0.005
RMSE
1000 0.067 0.071 0.176 0.093 0.315 0.181
3000 0.043 0.043 0.111 0.056 0.206 0.127
9000 0.029 0.025 0.080 0.037 0.156 0.083
G Appendix: Supplementary Tables for the Empirical Analysis
This appendix provides the supplementary tables (Tables 6 and 7) for the empirical application in Section 5.
Table 6: Definitions of the variables
Variables Definitions
Outcome GPA (grade point average)
Treatment 1 if at least one of (Smoke, Drink, Skip, Fight) is larger than 2; 0 otherwise, where
Smoke How often the respondent smoked cigarettes. (0: never - 6: nearly every day)
Drink How often the respondent drank alcohols. (0: never - 6: nearly every day)
Skip How often the respondent skipped school without excuses. (0: never - 6: nearly everyday)
Fight How often the respondent got into a physical fight in the past year. (0: never - 4: more than 7 times)
Age Age
Grade Grade
White 1 if the respondent is White; 0 otherwise.
Black 1 if the respondent is Black or African; 0 otherwise.
Asian 1 if the respondent is Asian; 0 otherwise.
Mother’s education The respondent’s mother’s education level in years.
Mother’s job (professional) 1 if the respondent’s mother is a worker with expertise or a managerial worker; 0 otherwise.
Mother’s job (unemployed) 1 if the respondent’s mother is not employed (except for housewife); 0 otherwise.
Father’s education The respondent’s father’s education level in years.
Father’s job (professional) 1 if the respondent’s father is a worker with expertise or a managerial worker; 0 otherwise.
Father’s job (unemployed) 1 if the respondent’s father is not employed (except for househusband); 0 otherwise.
Academic club 1 if the respondent belongs to an academic club; 0 otherwise.
Sports club 1 if the respondent belongs to a sport club; 0 otherwise.
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Table 7: Estimation results of the treatment decision model
γ0 Estimate t-value γ1 Estimate t-value
X Intercept -5.617 -8.627 X Intercept -3.000 -0.381
log(Age) 2.326 7.801 log(Age) -0.886 -0.277
Grade -0.071 -3.485 Grade 0.093 0.467
White -0.086 -1.694 White 2.261 2.373
Black -0.280 -3.643 Black 1.848 1.662
Asian -0.371 -4.195 Asian 3.415 3.131
log(Mother’s education + 1) -0.065 -2.684 log(Mother’s education + 1) -0.167 -0.559
Mother’s job (professional) -0.057 -1.521 Mother’s job (professional) 0.315 0.732
Mother’s job (unemployed) -0.068 -0.925 Mother’s job (unemployed) 0.049 0.052
log(Father’s education + 1) -0.088 -5.670 log(Father’s education + 1) 0.753 2.402
Father’s job (professional) -0.019 -0.391 Father’s job (professional) -0.142 -0.263
Father’s job (unemployed) -0.078 -0.974 Father’s job (unemployed) -0.195 -0.211
Academic club -0.118 -3.161 Academic club -0.534 -1.007
Sports club 0.002 0.070 Sports club -0.993 -2.177
Z Grade 0.022 2.938 Z Grade 0.070 0.858
White -0.005 -0.073 White 0.849 1.018
Black -0.177 -1.827 Black -1.293 -0.899
Asian -0.127 -1.110 Asian -0.294 -0.232
log(Mother’s education + 1) -0.004 -0.096 log(Mother’s education + 1) -0.202 -0.491
log(Father’s education + 1) -0.043 -1.438 log(Father’s education + 1) -0.469 -1.974
Academic club -0.112 -1.939 Academic club -1.097 -1.434
Sports club -0.087 -1.788 Sports club 0.191 0.340
ρ -0.674 -1.474 Sample size: 6053
λ 0.899 2.912 Log-likelihood: -7483.697
Note: The above result is based on the following model: Dj = 1(W˜>j γ0 + D−j · exp(W>j γ1)0.25 ≥ εj), where W˜j =
(Xj , Zj , School dummyj), andWj = (Xj , Zj). The school dummy variable is introduced only for large schools where the number of
respondents in each gender is larger than or equal to 120. The results for the school dummies are omitted to save space. The estimation
procedure is the same as in the Monte Carlo experiments.
KAKENHI Grant No. 15K17039. Yanagi acknowledges support from the JSPS under KAKENHI Grant No.
17K13715.
55
References
Aradillas-Lopez, A., 2010. Semiparametric estimation of a simultaneous game with incomplete information,
Journal of Econometrics, 157 (2), 409–431.
Aronow, P.M. and Samii, C., 2017. Estimating average causal effects under general interference, with application
to a social network experiment, The Annals of Applied Statistics, 11 (4), 1912–1947.
Bajari, P., Hong, H., and Ryan, S.P., 2010. Identification and estimation of a discrete game of complete
information, Econometrica, 78 (5), 1529–1568.
Balat, J. and Han, S., 2018. Multiple treatments with strategic interaction, arXiv working paper.
Belloni, A., Chernozhukov, V., Chetverikov, D., and Kato, K., 2015. Some new asymptotic theory for least
squares series: Pointwise and uniform results, Journal of Econometrics, 186 (2), 345–366.
Berry, S.T., 1992. Estimation of a model of entry in the airline industry, Econometrica, 889–917.
Bjorn, P.A. and Vuong, Q.H., 1984. Simultaneous equations models for dummy endogenous variables: a game
theoretic formulation with an application to labor force participation, Working paper.
Bresnahan, T.F. and Reiss, P.C., 1990. Entry in monopoly market, The Review of Economic Studies, 57 (4),
531–553.
Brinch, C.N., Mogstad, M., and Wiswall, M., 2017. Beyond late with a discrete instrument, Journal of Political
Economy, 125 (4), 985–1039.
Card, D. and Giuliano, L., 2013. Peer effects and multiple equilibria in the risky behavior of friends, Review of
Economics and Statistics, 95 (4), 1130–1149.
Carneiro, P. and Lee, S., 2009. Estimating distributions of potential outcomes using local instrumental variables
with an application to changes in college enrollment and wage inequality, Journal of Econometrics, 149 (2),
191–208.
Cattaneo, M.D. and Farrell, M.H., 2013. Optimal convergence rates, bahadur representation, and asymptotic
normality of partitioning estimators, Journal of Econometrics, 174 (2), 127–143.
Chen, X., 2007. Large sample sieve estimation of semi-nonparametric models, in: J.J. Heckman and E.E.
Leamer, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 6, chap. 76, 5549–5632.
Chen, X. and Christensen, T.M., 2015. Optimal uniform convergence rates and asymptotic normality for series
estimators under weak dependence and weak conditions, Journal of Econometrics, 188 (2), 447–465.
Chen, X. and Christensen, T.M., 2018. Optimal sup-norm rates and uniform inference on nonlinear functionals
of nonparametric iv regression, Quantitative Economics, 9 (1), 39–84.
Chesher, A. and Rosen, A.M., 2012. Simultaneous equations models for discrete outcomes: coherence, com-
pleteness, and identification, cemmap working paper, CWP21/12.
56
Ciliberto, F. and Tamer, E., 2009. Market structure and multiple equilibria in airline markets, Econometrica,
77 (6), 1791–1828.
Clark, A.E. and Loheac, Y., 2007. "It wasn’t me, it was them!" social influence in risky behavior by adolescents,
Journal of Health Economics, 26 (4), 763–784.
de Paula, A., 2013. Econometric analysis of games with multiple equilibria, Annual Review of Economics, 5,
107–131.
de Paula, A., 2017. Econometrics of network models, in: Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory
and Applications, Eleventh World Congress, Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 268–323.
de Paula, A. and Tang, X., 2012. Inference of signs of interaction effects in simultaneous games with incomplete
information, Econometrica, 80 (1), 143–172.
Ferracci, M., Jolivet, G., and van den Berg, G.J., 2014. Evidence of treatment spillovers within markets, Review
of Economics and Statistics, 96 (5), 812–823.
Frölich, M. and Huber, M., 2017. Direct and indirect treatment effects–causal chains and mediation analysis
with instrumental variables, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology),
79 (5), 1645–1666.
Gaviria, A. and Raphael, S., 2001. School-based peer effects and juvenile behavior, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 83 (2), 257–268.
Han, S. and Vytlacil, E.J., 2017. Identification in a generalization of bivariate probit models with dummy
endogenous regressors, Journal of Econometrics, 199 (1), 63–73.
Heckman, J.J. and Pinto, R., 2018. Unordered monotonicity, Econometrica, 86 (1), 1–35.
Heckman, J.J. and Vytlacil, E., 2005. Structural equations, treatment effects, and econometric policy evaluation,
Econometrica, 73 (3), 669–738.
Heckman, J.J. and Vytlacil, E.J., 1999. Local instrumental variables and latent variable models for identifying
and bounding treatment effects, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 96 (8), 4730–4734.
Holland, A.D., 2017. Penalized spline estimation in the partially linear model, Journal of Multivariate Analysis,
153, 211–235.
Hong, G. and Raudenbush, S.W., 2006. Evaluating kindergarten retention policy: A case study of causal
inference for multilevel observational data, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 101 (475),
901–910.
Hoshino, T., 2018. Two-step estimation of incomplete information social interaction models with sample
selection, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, (forthcoming).
Huang, J.Z., 2003. Local asymptotics for polynomial spline regression, The Annals of Statistics, 31 (5), 1600–
1635.
57
Hudgens, M.G. and Halloran, M.E., 2008. Toward causal inference with interference, Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 103 (482), 832–842.
Imbens, G.W. and Angrist, J.D., 1994. Identification and estimation of local average treatment effects, Econo-
metrica, 62 (2), 467–475.
Jun, S.J. and Pinkse, J., 2017. Counterfactual prediction in complete information games: point prediction under
partial identification, Working paper.
Khan, S. and Nekipelov, D., 2018. Information structure and statistical information in discrete response models,
Quantitative Economics, 9 (2), 995–1017.
Khan, S. and Tamer, E., 2010. Irregular identification, support conditions, and inverse weight estimation,
Econometrica, 78 (6), 2021–2042.
Kline, B., 2015. Identification of complete information games, Journal of Econometrics, 189 (1), 117–131.
Kooreman, P., 1994. Estimation of econometric models of some discrete games, Journal of Applied Economet-
rics, 9 (3), 255–268.
Lee, L.F., Li, J., and Lin, X., 2014. Binary choice models with social network under heterogeneous rational
expectations, Review of Economics and Statistics, 96 (3), 402–417.
Lee, S., 2007. Endogeneity in quantile regressionmodels: A control function approach, Journal of Econometrics,
141 (2), 1131–1158.
Lee, S. and Salanié, B., 2018. Identifying effects of multivalued treatments, arXiv working paper.
Lewbel, A., 2007. Coherency and completeness of structural models containing a dummy endogenous variable,
International Economic Review, 48 (4), 1379–1392.
Manski, C.F., 1993. Identification of endogenous social effects: The reflection problem, The Review of Economic
Studies, 60 (3), 531–542.
Mogstad, M., Santos, A., and Torgovitsky, A., 2018. Using instrumental variables for inference about policy
relevant treatment parameters, Econometrica, 86 (5), 1589–1619.
Mogstad,M., Torgovitsky, A., andWalters, C.R., 2019. Identification of causal effects withmultiple instruments:
Problems and some solutions, mimeo.
Nakajima, R., 2007. Measuring peer effects on youth smoking behaviour, The Review of Economic Studies,
74 (3), 897–935.
Newey, W.K., 2009. Two-step series estimation of sample selection models, The Econometrics Journal, 12,
S217–S229.
Newey, W.K. and McFadden, D., 1994. Large sample estimation and hypothesis testing, in: R.F. Engle and
D. McFadden, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 4, chap. 36, 2111–2245.
58
Rothenberg, T.J., 1971. Identification in parametric models, Econometrica, 577–591.
Soetevent, A.R. and Kooreman, P., 2007. A discrete-choice model with social interactions: with an application
to high school teen behavior, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22 (3), 599–624.
Stone, C.J., 1982. Optimal global rates of convergence for nonparametric regression, The Annals of Statistics,
1040–1053.
Tamer, E., 2003. Incomplete simultaneous discrete response model with multiple equilibria, The Review of
Economic Studies, 70 (1), 147–165.
Tropp, J.A., 2012. User-friendly tail bounds for sums of random matrices, Foundations of Computational
Mathematics, 12 (4), 389–434.
Vytlacil, E., 2002. Independence, monotonicity, and latent index models: An equivalence result, Econometrica,
70 (1), 331–341.
Zhou, S. and Wolfe, D.A., 2000. On derivative estimation in spline regression, Statistica Sinica, 93–108.
59
